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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 950720-CA
Priority No. 2

CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for (a) burglary, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1995), plus gang enhancement, and (b) theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995), plus
gang enhancement, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, Judge, presiding.

1

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions
will be determinative of the issues on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995), Presumption of innocence
-- "Element of the offense" defined.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995), Criminal responsibility
for direct commission of offense or for conduct of another.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), Offenses committed by
three or more persons -- Enhanced penalties.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 (1995), Court to determine law;
the jury, the facts.
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution.
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution.
Article I, Section 13, Utah Constitution.
Article I, Section 24, Utah Constitution.
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution.
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether the inclusion of (1) actus rea, (2) mens rea,

and (3) an enhanced penalty in a penal statute is sufficient to
create a separate offense entitling a criminal defendant to a
preliminary hearing, the presumption of innocence until each
2

element is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and a jury, pursuant
to Article I, sections 12 and 13 of the Utah Constitution, and
Utah statutory law.
2.

Whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), which (a)

fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited so that she/he may govern
her/his conduct accordingly, (b) delegates basic policy matters
to judges, and (c) interferes with a person's right to
association under the First Amendment to the federal
Constitution, is vague and arbitrary in violation of the due
process provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions.
3.

Whether interfering with a criminal defendant's

fundamental rights during a proceeding that requires the state to
make a showing concerning, among other things, the defendant's
culpable mental state violates Article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution.
4.

Whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), which

creates a sub-class of criminal defendants and unreasonably
interferes with their fundamental rights, violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the federal Constitution and Article I,
section 24, of the Utah Constitution.
All of the issues presented on appeal are questions of law,
with respect to which this Court will not defer in any degree to
the trial court but will review the trial court's determinations
for correctness.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).

3

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Appellant Christopher Cheeney ("Cheeney") filed a Motion to
Strike Gang Enhancement with the trial court, raising the
following issues:

Whether Section 76-3-203.1 violates specific

provisions of the Utah Constitution, including a criminal
defendant's right to a preliminary hearing, the presumption of
innocence, and a jury; whether Section 76-3-203.1 violates the
due process provisions of the state and federal constitutions;
whether Section 76-3-203.1 should be stricken under the void-forvagueness doctrine; and whether Section 76-3-203.1 violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution and the
Uniform Operation of Laws provision of the Utah Constitution.
The issues are preserved in the Record on Appeal ("R.") at 40-48.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
In an Information dated January 18, 1995, the State charged
Cheeney with numerous counts of burglary, a third degree felony
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), with gang
enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995); and
theft, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-4 04 (1995), with gang enhancement pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995).

(R. 8-12.)

Cheeney entered a guilty

plea in connection with one count of burglary and one count of
theft, plus gang enhancement, pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d
935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

The parties specifically conditioned
4

the plea upon the preservation of Cheeney's right to appeal the
constitutionality of Section 76-3-203.1. (R. 027-37, 111.)
Thereafter, Cheeney filed with the trial court a motion and
supporting memorandum to strike the enhancement statute.
040-48.)

(R.

The trial court denied the motion and entered judgement

against Cheeney, sentencing him to a term not to exceed five
years plus gang enhancement for burglary, and to a term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years plus gang
enhancement for theft. (R. 090-94.) Cheeney appeals from that
Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
CHEENEY PLED GUILTY TO BURGLARY AND THEFT PLUS GANG
ENHANCEMENT IN A SEEY-TYPE PLEA AGREEMENT IN ORDER THAT HE
COULD CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-203.1.
On January 18, 1995, the State charged Bryan 0. Rasmussen,
aka Brian Anderson ("Rasmussen"), Michael Chad Hoffman
("Hoffman"), and Christopher Cheeney ("Cheeney") by Information
with several counts of burglary, a third degree felony under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-202, and theft, a second degree felony under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.

(R. 008-012.)

The State provided

notice in the Information that "pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§76-3-203.1, . . . the defendants are subject to an enhanced
penalty as provided in that section because the above offense [s
were] committed in concert with two or more persons."

(Id.)

On September 8, 1995, Cheeney filed a Statement of
Defendant, which provides that Cheeney entered a plea of guilty
5

to the crimes of burglary and theft, with enhanced penalties,
(R. 028-32.)

Cheeney's plea is explicitly conditioned on his

preservation of the ability to challenge the constitutionality of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 and to withdraw the plea if it is
determined on appeal that the statute is unconstitutional.

(R.

036, 111 ("The State agrees that Defendant's plea shall be in the
nature of a Sery plea and, therefore, conditioned upon the
preservation of Defendant's right to appeal the constitutionality
of the Gang Enhancement Statute").)

State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935

(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In connection with Cheeney's plea, the trial court issued a
finding that Cheeney was "subject to an enhanced penalty as
provided in [Section 76-3-203.1]"

(R. 038-39, 092, 094), and

entered judgment against Cheeney on October 20, 1995, for
burglary plus gang enhancement (R. 091), and theft plus gang
enhancement.

(R. 093.)

The trial court sentenced Cheeney to

serve concurrent terms for the offenses (R. 091-94, 142), and
ordered that Cheeney would be jointly and severally liable with
"[his] friend, if not co-gang member, Rasmussen" to pay
restitution in the amount of $61,900.

(R. 142.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 identifies a specific actus rea
and a specific mens rea that must be proved before a criminal
defendant is subjected to the enhanced penalty identified in the
statute.

The statute has all the makings of a separate criminal

offense.

However, Section 76-3-203.1 by its terms carves out a
6

criminal defendant's right to a preliminary hearing, to the
presumption of innocence until the elements of the offense have
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and to a jury in a
proceeding to determine whether the statute has been violated.
The statute, therefore, is violative of the Utah Constitution and
must be stricken.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 is also void-for-vagueness in
violation of the federal due process clause.

The statute fails

to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, is susceptible to
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and interferes with
sensitive First Amendment freedoms.

It must be stricken on that

basis.
In addition, Section 76-3-203.1 violates the due process
provision of the Utah Constitution by failing to provide full and
fair disclosure to a criminal defendant, who is charged under the
statute.

Although the statute requires the state to prove in a

separate proceeding that the criminal defendant engaged "in
concert[ed]" conduct with others in the commission of the
underlying offense, the statute deprives the criminal defendant
of the full panoply of due process guarantees in that separate
proceeding, including the right to a preliminary hearing, the
presumption of innocence, and a jury.
Finally, Section 76-3-203.1 violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the federal Constitution and the Uniform Operation of
Laws provision of the Utah Constitution.
7

The statute creates a

sub-class of criminal defendants who are subjected to an enhanced
criminal penalty for associating with others.

Because the

statute interferes with the fundamental right of association, the
strict scrutiny test applies.

The statute must be stricken

unless the state can show that it is necessary to a compelling
state interest.

The state legislature has identified the "state

interest" as the elimination of gang-related crime.

Clearly, the

elimination of crime can never be so compelling that it
interferes with rights guaranteed by the state and federal
constitutions.
Further, under the "rational tendency" analysis of Article
I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution, the statute cannot be
justified.

The objective of the statute is to lock-up ganglords;

the tendency of the statute is to enhance the sentences of
persons who have no gang relations.

The statute does not have a

reasonable tendency to further the legislative objective.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. IN ONE FELL SWOOP, THE UTAH LEGISLATURE
CREATED A SEPARATE OFFENSE AND TOOK AWAY CERTAIN
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN A PROCEEDING FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED THAT OFFENSE.
In 1990, the Utah State Legislature enacted Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203.1, which provides in part the following:
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons is
subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as
provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used
in this section means the defendant and two or more
other persons would be criminally liable for the
8

offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an
indictment is returned, shall cause to be subscribed
upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or the
information or indictment in felony cases notice that
the defendant is subject to the enhanced penalties
provided under this section. The notice shall be in a
clause separate from and in addition to the substantive
offense charged.
*

*

*

(3) (a) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed
under this section are:
[90 days in a secure facility if the offense is a
class B misdemeanor, graduating to a minimum term
of 20 years if the offense is a capital offense
for which a life sentence is imposed.]
*

*

*

(5) (b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced
penalties under this section that the persons with whom
the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that
any of those persons are charged with or convicted of a
different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty
under this section. The imposition of the penalty is
contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that
this section is applicable. In conjunction with
sentencing the court shall enter written findings of
fact concerning the applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution
of the sentence required under this section if the
court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be
best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstance justifying
the disposition on the record and in writing.
The statute also states that the provisions do "not create any
separate offense", apparently in an effort to circumvent due

9

process and equal protection considerations.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-3-203.1(5) (a) (1995). Notwithstanding subsection (5) (a) , the
statute crosses the line to define a separate substantive offense
by combining a mental state with a criminal act for the purpose
of enhancing a sentence.

Thus, it must be analyzed on

constitutional grounds.
A.
THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE LEGISLATION IS NOT MET
BY THE STATUTE.
1.

The Legislative History of Section 76-3-203.1.

Although the purpose of Section 76-3-203.1 is not clear on
its face, it is reflected in the legislative history.
Legislative sponsors sought to enact the statute in order to
eradicate "gang-related" crime.

Senator Fordham stated:

Originally, we had a bill called the "Organization Gang
Bill." In working with California, who this bill was
patterned after . . . and after they passed their law,
we had an influx of gang members coming from California
and infiltrating into Utah and establishing residence
here and working . . . in their organization as members
[] who had broken off from the California gangs. I
think we need to send a message to these organized
people that there isn't a place for them in Utah.
(R. 084.)

Representative Rushton also expressed that the

objective of Section 76-3-203.1 was to combat the gang-organized
crime stemming from "California-based crack cocaine franchises,"
and that the statute was designed to apply in those narrow
circumstances:
The idea [here and] behind the enhanced penalties in
California . . . was to get that . . . core group of
hardened criminals that supplies the money, [] the
impetus for a true criminal street gang. . . . [This
leaves the social workers] to work with the remainder
of the young people at risk in these gangs.
(R. 077-79.)

During floor debates, Representative Joann Milner
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expressed that legislators should take personal responsibility in
their districts for gang problems and work to rehabilitate local
street gang members.

(R. 080.)

In response, Rushton stated:

[T]his law is directed at the core, it's not directed,
as Joann has expressed, [at] kids that are at risk, you
see them wearing the gang signs, their ball cap turned
around backwards on the West, or they sign X [to each]
other with finger signs like this as they go by. Each
gang has its own finger sign. . . . This bill is
directed at that core criminal element, that three
percent of those six hundred gang members that have
been identified that provide the father figure in these
gangs. And they provide also the connection [to] the
California gangs, the connection to the crack cocaine,
the money that is fueling this explosion of gang
activity in our cities.
(R. 083.)
To meet their objective, legislators claim they duplicated
and modified slightly, a California statute that they believed
was violative of that state's constitution.

Rushton stated:

Fordham and myself became alarmed about [street gang
issues] in about July of last year. We inquired of the
Los Angeles County Attorney's Office on what was being
done to prevent street gangs in there, they told us
about a piece of legislation in California called "The
Street Terrorism Prevention Act." We brought a copy of
that act to Utah, we got a lot of literature about it,
and we had a bill written up that patterned the Street
Terrorism Act. But since that time that [A]ct has run
into constitutional problems in California, so we had
representatives from SWAP, do a lot of research on it,
and they came up . . . with this bill, the group
criminal activities penalty, which they feel confident
avoids the constitutional problems of the California
Street Terrorism Act and will be a useful tool. It
doesn't have the political or the psychological effects
that our original Street Terrorism had, because we used
the term gang, we used the term street terrorism in our
[original] bill, and they told us this was the reason
why it would become constitutionally unsound. So if
you read the bill it will not have the [phrase] "street
gang" in it.
(R. 078-79) .

The similarities and differences between the Utah

statute and the California Act are set forth below.
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2.
The Current California Act and the Utah Statute
Are Markedly Distinguishable.
The California "Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
Act" was originally enacted in 1988. Cal. Penal Code § 186.20, et
seq. (West).

Notwithstanding Representative Rushton's comments,

it is still in force today and has been upheld in the face of
various constitutional challenges, most notably In re Alberto R.,
235 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 348 (1991), and People v.
Gamez, 235 Cal. App.3d 957, 286 Cal.Rptr. 894 (1991).
the Act and cases is attached hereto as Addendum C.)
will be repealed by its terms on January 1, 1997.

(A copy of
The statute

Cal. Penal

Code § 186.22(g) (West).
The California Act is similar to the Utah statute in the
following respects:
o

It imposes minimum mandatory sentences on persons
who violate certain provisions of the statute.
Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(4), (c), (d).

o

It permits the court to suspend imposition of the
enhanced sentence "where the interests of justice
would best be served, if the court specifies on
the record and enters into the minutes the
circumstances indicating that the interests of
justice would best be served by that disposition."
Id. at § 186.22(d).

o

It is a violation of the Act if one of the
enumerated offenses is committed "by two or more
persons." Id. at § 186.22(e); cf. note 1, infra.

The provisions of the California Act depart from the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 in at least the
following respects:
o

The California legislature specifically recognized
in the Act the constitutional right of every
citizen to lawfully associate with others who
12

share similar beliefs, and states in the Act that
it intends to eradicate street gang criminal
activity by "focusing upon patterns of criminal
gang activity and upon the organized nature of
street gangs, which together, are the chief source
of terror created by street gangs." Cal. Penal
Code § 186.21.
o

o

The California legislature recognized that the Act
was urgently and overwhelmingly necessary. It
specifically found violent street gang activities
to "present a clear and present danger to public
order and safety". Lawmakers studied the
California crisis before passing the Act into law.
In Los Angeles alone, "there were 328 gang-related
murders in 1986, and [] gang homicides in 1987 []
increased 80 percent over 1986." Id. at § 186.21.

The Act creates a separate,

substantive

criminal

offense
by making it unlawful for a person to
actively participate in "any criminal street gang
with knowledge that its members engage in or have

engaged in a pattern

of criminal

crancr

activity,

and [any person] who willfully promotes, furthers,
or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by
members of that gang, shall be punished by
imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to
exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state
prison for 16 months, or 2 or 3 years." Id. at §
186.22 (a) -1
O

In addition to creating the separate, substantive
offense, the Act contains an enhanced sentencing
provision. Id. at § 186.22(b). That provision
subjects any person who is convicted of a felony
to an enhanced sentence if the felony was
committed "for the benefit of, at the direction
of, or in association with any criminal street

1

Section 186.22(e) of the California Act defines "pattern of
criminal gang activity" as the commission of two or more of the
specifically enumerated offenses "Jbv two or more
persons".
The "pattern" language is used only in subsection (a) of the Act,
which creates a separate, substantive offense. See People v. Gamez, 286
Cal.Rptr. at 974.
In drafting the Utah statue, legislators apparently copied and
modified the California Act by stating that a person violates the Utah
statute by committing one of the enumerated offenses in concert "with two
or more persons". Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1) (a) (1995) . However,
legislators apparently failed to realize that they were copying that
portion of the California Act that creates a separate,
substantive

offense.

13

gang, with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang
members." Id.
o

The California Court of Appeals for the Fourth
District recognized that before a violation of the
enhanced sentencing provision could be upheld, it
must consider whether the trier of fact found the
essential elements of the provision "beyond a
reasonable doubt."
People v. Gamez, 286 Cal.
Rptr. at 906.

o

The California Act defines "criminal street gang"
as an "ongoing organization, association, or group
of three or more persons . . . having as one of
its primary activities the commission of one or
more of the criminal acts enumerated in [the
statute], having a common name or common
identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
individually or collectively engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity."
Cal. Penal Code § 186,22(f).

o

California courts are required to apply the Act in
the narrowest and strictest of circumstances. See
Alberto R., 1 Cal.Rptr.2d at 355.

The differences between the California Act and the Utah
statute emphasize the problems with the Utah statute: Because the
Utah legislature failed to adopt clarifying definitions and
specific language relating to the purpose of the statute, the
Utah statute violates important constitutional guarantees, where
the California Act does not.
B.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 VIOLATES EXPLICIT
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
In a proceeding to determine whether a defendant has
violated Section 76-3-203.1, the statute by its terms eliminates
a defendant's right to be presumed innocent until the elements of
the offense are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, to a jury
trial, and to a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause.
14

Each of those rights are explicitly guaranteed to a criminal
defendant and protected against state action under the Utah
Constitution and well-established law.

See Utah Const, art. I,

§§ 12 and 13 (respectively, right to a jury and to a preliminary
hearing); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-501 (1995) (right to be presumed
innocent) and 77-17-10 (1995) (right to a jury); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970) (right to be
presumed innocent).

By interfering with those rights, Section

76-3-203.1 violates specific provisions of the Utah Constitution.
1.
The Statute Interferes with a Defendant's Right to
Be Presumed Innocent Until the Elements of the Offense
Are Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
Fundamental to Utah's criminal jurisprudence is the
proposition that a person is presumed innocent "until each
element

of

the

offense11

reasonable doubt.

charged against him is proved beyond a

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) (emphasis

added); accord State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981);
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980); State v. Murphy,
617 P.2d 399, 402 n.5 (Utah 1980); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d
466, 468-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25
L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970) (the due process clause
"protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged").
The phrase "element of the offense" is defined at Section
76-1-501(2)(b) as the criminal defendant's "culpable mental
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state."2

Accordingly, when a penal statute requires proof of a

criminal defendant's culpable mental state, the proof must meet
the "reasonable doubt" standard.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1)

and (2)(b) (1995); see also People v. Gamez, 286 Cal.Rptr. at
906; State v. Powers, 742 P.2d 792, 794-95 (Ariz. 1987) (because
the enhancement statute required proof of the defendant's
culpability, defendant was entitled to a jury and the presumption
of innocence); State v. Hurley, 741 P.2d 257, 263 (Ariz. 1987)
(because sentencing statute did not require additional evaluation
of mens rea, the need for a jury trial and findings by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is less compelling).
In construing Section 76-3-2 03.1, the Utah Supreme Court in
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994), implicitly
determined that the statute requires proof of the defendant's
"culpable mental state" before the enhanced penalty will be
imposed.

Specifically, the court rejected the argument that

persons with whom the criminal defendant "acted in concert must
be parties to the offense . . . and possess the [culpable] mental

2

Section 76-1-501 provides the following:

(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to
be innocent until each element of the offense charged against
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such
proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the
offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden
in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not
elements of the offense but shall be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.
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state required for that offense." Id.

Rather, the defendant's

responsibility "is determined by his own mental state."

Id.

(quoting. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983)).
Since the defendant must bear the responsibility for
violating Section 76-3-203.1, his responsibility is determined by
his mental state; therefore, the state must prove the defendant
had the "culpable mental state" to engage in concerted conduct.
Sister states require a showing of "purpose", "conscious action",
"intent", and "knowledge", for "in concert" conduct.

See Gilbert

H. Moen Company v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 878 P.2d 1246,
1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added) ("In concert" action
requires that the "actors consciously act together in an unlawful
manner"); Elliott v. Barnes, 645 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Wash. Ct. App.
1982) (for action in concert, "the following three elements must
exist: (1) A concert of action; (2) a unity of purpose or design;
(3) two or more defendants working separately but to a common
purpose and each acting with the knowledge and consent of the
others"); State v. Kister, 1995 WL 731213 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995);
Black's Law Dictionary 262 (5th ed. 1979) (Concerted action:
"Action that has been planned, arranged, adjusted, agreed on and
settled between parties acting together pursuant to some design
or scheme").
Accordingly, the "in concert" element in Section 76-3-203.1
requires proof of the defendant's mental culpability and must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
501(2) (b) (1995).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-

Any lesser standard invites perfunctory

application and chisels away at the connection that must be
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established between the defendant and the "two or more other
persons"; it inappropriately permits application of Section 76-3203.1 on mere testimony that other unidentified persons were
somewhere in the area at the time the defendant committed the
underlying offense.
"In concert" conduct is the subjective element of a separate
substantive offense (the mens rea), and the conviction of the
underlying offense is the objective element (the actus rea).

In

addition to and after proving that the criminal defendant had the
requisite culpability to commit the underlying offense, the state
must show the actus rea and the mens rea identified in Section
76-3-203.1 -- that the criminal defendant had the culpable mental
state to act in concert with two or more persons in the
commission of that offense.3
The statute creates a separate criminal offense that if
violated subjects the criminal defendant to an enhanced penalty.
Because it denies a criminal defendant the fundamental right to
be presumed innocent until the elements are proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is unconstitutional and must be stricken.
2.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 Interferes with a
Criminal Defendant's Right to a Jury.
The Utah Constitution and statutory law afford persons
charged with serious offenses the right to a jury.

Article I,

section 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 (1995); Utah Rules of

3

"In concert" conduct also may be construed to describe both the
proscribed conduct and attendant circumstances of an offense, thereby
making "in concert" conduct an "element of the offense" under Section 761-501(2)(a).
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Criminal Procedure 17.

Since before Utah's statehood, Utah

courts have construed that right to engage when the issue is one
of fact in a criminal proceeding.

People v. Biddlecome, 3 Utah

208, 2 P. 194, 198 (1882) ("By the statute the jurors are made
the sole judges of the facts").

It is well established that the

jury is provided with the sole ability to judge the facts in
criminal matters and to weigh the evidence.
the judge from invading that province.

The law prohibits

See State v. Green, 78

Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931); State v. Diaz, 76 Utah 463, 290
P. 727, 731 (1930); State v. Bruno, 69 Utah 444, 256 P. 109, 110
(1927); State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 P. 987, 989 (1908);
State v. James, 32 Utah 152, 89 P. 460, 463 (1907); Biddlecome, 2
P. at 198.4
A criminal defendant's mental state traditionally is a
question of fact for the jury.

Because Section 76-3-203.1

requires proof of the defendant's mental state, it identifies an
issue of fact in a criminal proceeding that must be presented to
the jury.

However, because the legislature has directed that

the factual issues be determined by a judge, the statute invades
the province of the jury.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5) (c) .

If the jury is prevented by the legislature from making

4

The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution likewise
protects the Sixth Amendment right to a jury from state action. See
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 88 S.Ct. 1444 (1968)
(the right to a jury trial for the criminal defendant is protected from
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution) ;
see also Medlock v. 1985 Ford F 150 Pick Up, 417 S.E.2d 85, 87 (S.C.
1992) ("The legislature cannot abrogate the right to a jury trial" simply
with labels) .
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findings of fact, a criminal defendant is denied a fundamental
right in violation of Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution.

See State v. Anderson, 603 A.2d 928 (N.J. 1992)

(court concluded that statute specifying that "materiality" would
be determined by the court as a question of law violated the
state constitution); State v. Wedge, 652 P.2d 773, 778 (Or.
1982); State v. Ouinn, 623 P.2d 630 (Or. 1981) (right to have all
elements of a crime decided by jury, guaranteed by the Oregon
Constitution, was violated by death penalty statute that allowed
court rather than jury to determine defendant's mental state in
committing crime of murder, for purposes of imposing death
sentence). 5
5

Section 76-3-203.1 is distinguishable from the minimum mandatory
sentencing statute identified in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,
91 L.Ed.2d 67, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986) . In that case, anyone convicted of
certain felonies was subjected to a minimum mandatory sentence of five
years imprisonment if the sentencing judge determined from the evidence
presented at trial and additional evidence offered by either party that
the person visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the
felony offense. As the Court recognized, the Pennsylvania legislature
"simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing
courts to bear on punishment -- the instrumentality used in committing
a violent felony -- and dictated the precise weight to be given that
factor if the instrumentality is a firearm." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 8990, 91 L.Ed.2d at 78-79.
Section 76-3-203.1 differs from the Pennsylvania statute in that it
requires proof of "in concert" conduct, which goes to the defendant's
culpability. The "in concert" factor is not traditionally considered by
sentencing courts.
In addition, determining the culpability of a
defendant for sentencing purposes is far more complicated and more
intrusive than determining whether the defendant used a firearm in the
commission of an offense, because it requires more than merely observing
that the defendant fired a gun at the victim or brandished a weapon
during a robbery. It requires probing the defendant's mental state to
determine whether it was in the defendant's mind that the "other persons"
be implicated in the crime, or whether it was in the defendant's mind to
commit the crime alone, and the other persons were unexpected and
unexpecting companions. Because "in concert" conduct is more complicated
to prove, the risk is greater that the proof will be misunderstood.
Consequently, it should be an issue for the jury requiring the heightened
standard of proof: "beyond a reasonable doubt".
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Requiring a jury determination of at least the "in concert"
element would bring Section 76-3-203.1 into accord with similar
Utah provisions.

Utah law provides for a jury determination and

proof beyond a reasonable doubt both under the dangerous weapon
enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1995)) and the
habitual criminal statutes (Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001, et. seq.
(1995)) .

In capital cases, aggravating circumstances must be

proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Tillman,

750 P.2d 546, 577-80. 585-88, 591 (Utah 1987) (Stewart, Durham,
and Zimmerman, JJ., in separate opinions, collectively holding
that aggravating circumstances are elements of the crime which
the jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt).
Section 76-3-203.1 serves a purpose similar to those provisions.
The same right to a jury should apply.

Because the statute

interferes with that right, it must be stricken.
3.
Section 76-3-203.1 Violates Article I, Section 13
of the Utah Constitution.
Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution requires, in
pertinent part, that offenses be prosecuted "by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the
State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and
commitment."

The accused's right to a preliminary hearing is a

substantial one.

State v. Pay, 45 Utah 412, 146 P. 300 (1915).

The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that unless a criminal defendant
is subjected to a preliminary examination for the violation of a
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criminal statute, the prosecution is not authorized to continue
with a proceeding relating to the violation. State v. Jensen, 103
Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1943); State v. Freeman, 93 Utah
125, 71 P.2d 196, 199 (1937); State v. Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176
P. 860, 861 (1918).
By enacting Section 76-3-203.1, the legislature has denied a
criminal defendant the right to a preliminary hearing in
connection with allegations that he/she violated the statute.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(2)(a) and (5)(a) (1995).

Because

Section 76-3-203.1 creates a separate criminal offense that
subjects a criminal defendant to an enhanced sentence, a criminal
defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing.

Section 76-3-

203.l's failure to recognize this substantial right renders it
unconstitutional.
POINT II. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 IS VOID-FORVAGUENESS UNDER A FEDERAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS.
Section 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional under a federal due
process analysis.

Basic principles of due process prohibit the

enactment of a statute if it is vague on its face.
Vague laws offend several important values. First,
because we assume that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may
act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by
not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws
must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them.
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. Third, but related, where a vague statute
22

f,

abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of
[those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead
citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone'
. . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas
were clearly marked."
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 33 L.Ed.2d
222, 227-28, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972) (footnotes omitted); see also
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909, 103
S.Ct. 1855 (1983); Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d
816, 819 (Utah 1991). In applying the Gravned test to state
legislation, the United States Supreme Court has expressed less
tolerance for enactments that carry criminal penalties.

Village

of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 498-99, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371-72, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (1982).

The

Court has explained that the vagueness doctrine is critical with
respect to a legislative failure to provide sufficient guidelines
concerning the application of a penal statute.
Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual
freedoms within a frame work of ordered liberty.
Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined
for substantive authority and content as well as for
definiteness or certainty of expression.
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Although the
doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and
arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that
the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is
not actual notice, but the other principal element of
the doctrine -- the requirement that a legislature
establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement." Where the legislature fails to provide
such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit
"a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
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predilections."
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58 (citations omitted).

Since a

violation of Section 76-3-203.1 carries an enhanced criminal
penalty, the Court should be intolerant of the additional due
process considerations it breaches, as set forth below.
A.
SECTION 76-3-203.1 FAILS TO GIVE THE PERSON OF
ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO KNOW
WHAT IS PROHIBITED.
The first consideration under Grayned is whether a statute
gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited so that he may govern himself
accordingly.

See State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986)

(vague penal law stricken under due process analysis).

Section

76-3-203.1 fails that consideration in two respects.
First, Section 76-3-203.1 provides that a criminal defendant
may be in violation of the statute if he has acted "in concert
with two or more persons", even if the persons "with whom the
actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified,
apprehended, charged, or convicted," or "those persons are
charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5) (b) (1995) . A person of ordinary
intelligence should not be required to decipher what it means to
act "in concert" with two or more unidentified

or

uncharged

persons, especially where the puzzling concept carries with it
the possibility of an enhanced sentence for the alleged conduct.
See State v. Brown, 629 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1994). Since the statute
may be applied based on the actions of unidentified, uncharged
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individuals, a criminal defendant is denied notice of the
allegations and is precluded from meeting them.
Second, the legislative history of Section 76-3-203.1
reflects that the statute is intended to be enforced in select
cases involving gangs and is intended to target ganglords.
Argument, Point I.A.I.

See

The intent of the legislation is not

reflected in the plain language of the statute, leaving the
manner of enforcement in question.
In Alberto R., 235 Cal.App.3d at 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d at
348, the defendant urged the court to find the California Act
unconstitutional on the basis that it was void-for-vagueness. The
court rejected the argument and determined that the Act did not
require persons of ordinary intelligence to guess at the
applicability of the statute, in part because the plain language
of the Act specified that it focused on "criminal street gangs"
and it clearly defined that phrase.
354, 357.

Alberto R., 1 Cal.Rptr.2d at

The intent of the legislature was set forth in the

language of the Act, thereby ensuring strict and narrow
application of its provisions.

Id. at 355.

The vagueness issues surrounding Utah's statute cannot be so
easily resolved.

Until the focus of Section 76-3-203.1 is

clearly identified and defined, persons cannot be expected to
conform their conduct to the statute.
B.
SECTION 76-3-203.1 IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO ARBITRARY AND
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT.
The second consideration under Grayned is whether the law
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provides sufficiently explicit standards for those who apply it
in order that it will not be arbitrarily and discriminately
enforced.

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy

matters to police, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application.

Section 76-3-203.1 impermissibly

delegates basic policy matters to judges for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, as reflected in the legislative history
and the text of the statute.
According to the legislative history, judges are expected to
use their discretion in determining whether Section 76-3-203.1
applies, as reflected in Representative Rushton's statements:
[T]he sentencing judge, rather than the jury, shall
decide whether to impose the penalty. We are not going
to make any effort to take the judicial discretion out
of this penalty phase. It will give the judge the
right, if he feels that an individual needs to be taken
out of that situation for this enhanced period of time,
the judge still has the discretion to either take him
out for an enhanced period of time or . . . not.
(R. 079.)

In response to questions concerning the broad language

of the statute, and whether persons who are not members of actual
gangs will be convicted under the statute of "essentially gang
activities", Representative Rushton assured legislators that
judicial discretion could be trusted to apply the statute in the
limited, gang-related circumstances intended.

(R. 079.)

Legislators intended that judges decide whether to apply the
statute to every person convicted of a crime "in concert" with
"two or more persons," or only those persons associated with
gangs.

(R. 079.)
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Likewise, the text permits the judge to apply or suspend
application of the statute at whim.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

203.1(6) (1995). It encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing
to clearly define how the interests of justice are served by
suspending, on the one hand, or enforcing, on the other hand, the
statute.

Justice Howe described the hazards of such a statute:

It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature
could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside
and say who could be rightfully detained, and who
should be set at large. This would, to some extent,
substitute the judicial for the legislative department
of the government.
State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Utah 1986) (Howe, J.,
concurring) (quoting, U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L.Ed.
2d 563 (1875)). Section 76-3-203.1 casts a large net, and leaves
it to the courts to decide who will be subjected to the
enhancement and who will not.

The California Act avoids the

issue of arbitrary enforcement in part by defining the phrase,
and clearly articulating that the Act applies to, "criminal
street gangs."

Cal. Penal Code § 186.22 (West).

The Utah statute also leaves a matter of procedure to the
discretion of judges by failing to identify the burden of proof
that must be met by the state in order for the criminal defendant
to be found in violation of the statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

203.1(5) (c) (1995) . . Judges may apply various burdens of proof to
justify the findings, making application of the statute arbitrary
and capricious.

As set forth above (Point I.A.2., supra), the

California courts avoid that issue by recognizing that the fact
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finder must apply the heightened burden of proof, beyond a
reasonable doubt, to determine whether the Act has been violated.
In order to be constitutional, the legislature is required
to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.
Otherwise, it has provided a "standardless sweep [that] allows
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58; Gravned, 408 U.S.
at 109.

The vague provisions of the Utah gang enhancement

statute may be used improperly by judges who might be consciously
or subconsciously inclined to discriminate against certain
classes of individuals.

See e.g., Gravned. 408 U.S. at 108-09.

Inasmuch as the constitution protects those most vulnerable to
governmental discrimination, Section 76-3-203.1 must be stricken.
C.
SECTION 76-3-203.1 INTERFERES WITH SENSITIVE FIRST
AMENDMENT FREEDOMS.
The third consideration under Gravned is whether the statute
inhibits the exercise of "basic First Amendment freedoms".

criminal

conduct

in association

with

others

While

clearly is not

protected by the First Amendment, see Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 516-17, 95 L.Ed.2d 1137, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951), mere
association with others is.

N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,

2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 78 S.Ct. 1163 (1958) ("[I]t is beyond debate that
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
embraces freedom of speech").
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In the event the state is not required to prove that the
criminal defendant had the requisite mental capacity to act "in
concert with two or more persons" in the commission of the
offense (see Point I.B.I., supra), the statute is not limited in
its application to penalizing criminal
with

others.

conduct

in

association

Its application becomes much broader than that --

the statue penalizes mere association with other persons.
Because the state is not required to prove the mental state,
identity or conviction of the persons with whom the criminal
defendant allegedly associated in the commission of the offense,
see State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 450; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1(5) (b) (1995), the possibility of receiving an enhanced
penalty merely for associating with two or more persons exists
based on the mere identification of the criminal defendant in
association with other persons.

The statute causes citizens to

fI/

steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the

boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked" and to
avoid the association of other persons in order to avoid the
uncertainty of the enforcement of the statute.
Again, the California Act avoids violating a person's
freedom of association in a number of ways, including the
following: (1) It makes "intentional" and "knowing" conduct
actionable -- the specific intent phrases save it from being too
vague or broad in its application, see Cal. Penal Code §
186.22(a), (b), and Alberto R., 1 Cal.Rptr.2d at 353-54, 357; (2)
it specifically exempts from the Act "employees engaged in
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concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection, or the
activities of labor organizations or their members or agents,"
Cal. Penal Code § 186.23; (3) it clearly defines "criminal street
gang" as an organization having as one of its primary activities
the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in
the statute, Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(f); (4) it is very narrowly
and strictly applied and its elements must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, Alberto R., 1 Cal.Rptr.2d at 354; Gamez, 286
Cal.Rptr. at 906.

The Utah statute is void of those safeguards.

D. SECTION 76-3-203.1 FAILS THE UTAH RATIONAL MANNER
ANALYSIS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court held that Article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution required that portions of a statute governing the
sentencing of mentally ill offenders be stricken because the
statutory provisions were arbitrary and capricious.
rational relationship to the purposes of the statute.
1272.

They bore no
Id. at

As set forth at Point I.A. of the Argument, supra, the

Utah legislators expected and intended the gang enhancement
statute to eradicate gang-related crime.

The statute is far more

reaching in its application than it was intended and is not
logically related to the purpose identified by the legislature.
See Argument, Point I.A., supra, and IV.B., infra. For that
reason it must be stricken as violative of Article I, section 7
of the Utah Constitution.
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POINT III. THE UTAH LEGISLATURE HAS WRITTEN IMPORTANT
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS OUT OF § 76-3-203.1 PROCEEDINGS
IN VIOLATION OF STATE DUE PROCESS.
The statute also is unconstitutional under a state due
process analysis.

The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that

"fundamental fairness requires that procedures both in the guilt
phase and in the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding be
designed to insure that the decision-making process is based on
accurate information." State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah
1980); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982)
("Procedural fairness is as obligatory at the sentencing phase of
a trial as at a guilt phase").

In order to meet that

requirement, the court looked to the Oregon Supreme Court's
approach in Buchea v. Sullivan, 262 Or. 222, 497 P.2d 1169
(1977), and recognized a criminal defendant's right to counsel,
to exculpatory evidence, and to be confronted by witnesses in the
guilt and sentencing phases of a criminal proceeding.

Lipsky,

656 P.2d at 1247-48.
The sentencing philosophy of the criminal law is that
the punishment should not only fit the crime but the
defendant as well. It is essential that fairness in
sentencing both be perceived as such by the public and
the defendant and, in fact, be fair. The information
about the defendant must be accurate if society and the
individual are to be properly served.
Id. at 1248-49.
In State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1005, the Utah Supreme
Court considered whether Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(2) violated the
fairness doctrine of the due process clause during sentencing
proceedings.

The statute stated in relevant part the following:
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"Prior to imposition of any sentence . . . the court may . . .
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable
period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence report
on the defendant . . . .

The court may disclose

the report to the defendant or his counsel as
justice

requires."

all or parts of
the

Id. at 1007 (emphasis added).

interest

of

Although

Section 77-18-1(2) appeared to be in conflict with Lipsky by
making full disclosure and fairness optional rather than
compulsory, the court squared it with constitutional mandates by
stating that the seemingly subjective standard was not intended
to be applied at the whim of a judge.
[Rather, u]nder that standard, it is the exceptional
case where full disclosure is not justified. Only when
disclosure of the presentence report would jeopardize
the life or safety of third parties, should there be
deletions from the report to protect them. In such
cases, disclosure to a defendant of as much of the
report as possible should be made. Identifying indicia
of a person who would be threatened should be excluded
from the report, sealed, and included in the report on
appeal. In all other cases, full disclosure of the
report should be made.
Id. at 1008.
In connection with ruling that fairness and full disclosure
is required in sentencing proceedings, the Casarez and Lipsky
courts looked to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 87 S.Ct. 1209
(1967).

In that case, petitioner was convicted under Colorado's

criminal laws of committing a sex offense, and then sentenced
under the Sex Offenders Act (the "Act"), a separate law.
authorized trial courts to order examinations of criminal
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The Act

defendants, to receive reports relating to the examinations, and
to use the reports in determining whether a criminal defendant
constituted a "threat of bodily harm or was an habitual offender
and mentally ill."

IcL. 386 U.S. at 608.

The Act made the "conviction the basis for commencing" the
separate sentencing proceeding.

Id.

Once the trial court made

its determination under the Act, it could sentence the criminal
defendant to an indeterminate term of from one day to life. The
petitioner was afforded "no hearing in the normal sense, no right
of confrontation and so on" in connection with the sentencing
proceeding.

Id.

The United States Supreme Court held that the Act was
deficient in due process, including the right to counsel and to
confront witnesses, as measured by the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

In its ruling, the Court considered a

comparable Pennsylvania statute:
It is a separate criminal proceeding which may be
invoked after conviction of one of the specified
crimes. Petitioner therefore was entitled to a full
judicial hearing before the magnified sentence was
imposed. At such a hearing the requirements of due
process cannot be satisfied by partial or niggardly
procedural protections. A defendant in such a
proceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the
relevant protections which due process guarantees in
state criminal proceedings. He must be afforded all
those safeguards which are fundamental rights and
essential to a fair trial, including the right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Id. 386 U.S. at 609-10 (quoting Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d
302, 312 (3rd Cir. 1966)).
Although Specht does not specifically recognize a criminal
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defendant's right to a preliminary hearing, the presumption of
innocence until each element is proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
and a jury in connection with new elements raised in sentencing
proceedings, this Court should interpret Article I, section 7 as
protecting such interests, particularly where the additional
elements concern the criminal defendant's culpable mental state.
See Argument, Point I.B.I., supra.

Such an interpretation would

be consistent with the concerns raised in Lipsky and Casarez, and
would be appropriate since Utah courts recognize greater
protections under the Utah due process provision than are
afforded under the federal provision.
In Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991),
the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that the interests guaranteed
by the Utah due process provision are more expansive than those
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

In that case, the court

rejected the United States Supreme Court's determination that
parole is not a liberty interest protected under a constitutional
due process analysis: "[T]he reasoning of [the United States
Supreme Court in] Greenholt has little persuasive force when
addressing a due process claim under the Utah Constitution in the
context of our indeterminate sentencing scheme."

Id. at 734.

In recognizing that the Utah Declaration of Rights is more
far-reaching in its protections than is the federal Bill of
Rights, the Utah Supreme Court also stated the following:
[T]he mandate of the due process clause of article I,
section 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah
Constitution is comprehensive in its application to all
activities of state government. It is the province of
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the judiciary to assure that a claim of the denial of
due process by an arm of government be heard and, if
justified, that it be vindicated.
Id. at 735
According to Foote, the Utah Constitution requires that due
process protections be afforded when "the actual number of years
a defendant is to serve" is determined.

Id. at 735.

Because the

gang enhancement statute introduces new elements to be proved,
and mandates that a criminal defendant serve an enhanced sentence
of a specific number of years if he is found to be in violation
of that statute, the full panoply of due process protections must
be extended to the criminal defendant.

The Oregon courts7

approach should serve as a guide to the Utah approach.
Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1247.

See

The courts in that jurisdiction have

assured protections under state constitutional provisions in
connection with schemes and statutes that are strikingly similar
to Section 76-3-203.1.
In State v. Wedge, 652 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982), the Oregon
Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of a
sentencing enhancement statute.

In that case, a jury convicted

the defendant of committing first degree robbery with two other
individuals, but made no finding with respect to whether the
defendant used a firearm in the commission of the crime.

At the

sentencing proceeding, the trial court found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Wedge used or threatened to use a firearm and enhanced
Wedge's sentence.

In reversing the conviction and ruling that

the statute was unconstitutional, the Oregon court stated:
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Although the challenged statute is denominated an
enhanced penalty statute, in effect it creates a new
crime. The jury only considered evidence offered on
the question of first degree robbery, and convicted him
of that offense, but the defendant was sentenced on the
basis of having been found guilty of the crime of
"first degree robbery using a firearm." If the
legislature had actually described the crime as "first
degree robbery using a firearm" the use of a firearm
would certainly be an element and there would be no
doubt defendant would have a right to a jury
determination of guilt. The legislature cannot
eliminate constitutional protections by separating and
relabeling elements of a crime.
Id. at 778; see also State v. Ouinn, 623 P.2d 630, 642-43 (Or.
1981); State v. Mitchell, 734 P.2d 379, 382 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
The fundamental principles set forth in Specht, Wedge, and
Ouinn are consistent with the concerns raised by the Utah Supreme
Court in Lipsky and Casarez. A criminal defendant is entitled to
procedural due process protections during the sentencing phase,
particularly where additional elements, including the criminal
defendant's mental culpability, will be considered by the fact
finder in order to impose an enhanced sentence.
Because Section 76-3-203.1 mandates a criminal defendant to
serve an enhanced sentence for engaging in conduct in concert
with others, the criminal defendant is entitled to a preliminary
hearing and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury on the
matter.

"[T]he extent of punishment is to be determined

according to the existence of the proscribed fact," e.g., "in
concert" conduct.

"[I]t must be proved at trial" to a jury.

Wedge, 860 P.2d at 132.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 is deficient

for failing to provide the full panoply of due process
guarantees.

For that reason, it is unconstitutional.
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POINT IV. SECTION 76-3-203.1 VIOLATES THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND THE
UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS PROVISION OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides,
"all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."

It

embodies the same general principle against discrimination as the
Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution: "persons
similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in
different circumstances should not be treated as if their
circumstances were the same."

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669

(Utah 1984); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 13 L.Ed.2d 222,
85 S.Ct. 283 (1964).
Whether a statute discriminates against a class of persons
in violation of the Uniform Operation of Laws provision of the
Utah Constitution or the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution depends on the effect of the statute and its
objectives.

Under both the Utah and the federal scheme, if the

statute deals with particularly sensitive constitutional values
or discriminates based on suspect classifications, the court will
apply a heightened scrutiny of legislative means and ends,
involving a real and thoughtful examination of legislative
purpose and the relationship between the legislation and that
purpose. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 582 (Utah 1993); State v.
Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398 (Utah 1989) (strict scrutiny test is used
if a challenged classification is "suspect" or if a "fundamental
interest" is involved); Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775
P.2d 348, 356, 358 (Utah 1989).
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The Utah and the federal schemes diverge, however, if a
fundamental right or a suspect class is not affected by the
statutory classification.

Under the Equal Protection Clause of

the United States Constitution, the analysis has been articulated
as follows:

"a statutory classification is constitutional unless

it has no rational

relationship

to a legislatively stated purpose

or, if not stated, to any reasonably conceivable legislative
purpose."

Lee, 867 P.2d at 580 (emphasis added).

With respect to the analysis under the Utah provision, the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
Although [Article I, section 24] is sometimes thought
to have the same effect and impose the same legal
standards on legislative action as the equal protection
guarantee found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, the language and history of
the two provisions are entirely different, and even
though there are important areas of overlap in the
concepts embodied in the two provisions, the
differences can produce different legal consequences.
As stated in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah
1984), "The different language of Article I, § 24, the
different constitutional contexts of the two
provisions, and different jurisprudential
considerations may lead to a different result in
applying equal protection principles under Article I, §
24 than might be reached under federal law."
Lee, 867 P.2d at 577.
To that end, Utah courts apply the following standard if a
fundamental right or a suspect class is not affected by the
classification: "First, a law must apply equally to all persons
within a class" and " [s]econd, the statutory classifications and
the different treatment given the classes must be based on
differences that have a reasonable
objectives of the statute.

tendency

to further the

If the relationship of the
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classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable or
fanciful, the discrimination is unreasonable."

Malan, 693 P.2d

at 670 (emphasis added; citations omitted); Mountain Fuel Supply
Company v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah
1988); see also State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 467 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) .
Since the Utah "reasonable tendency" standard is more
rigorous than and will always meet or exceed the federal
"rational basis" standard, Utah courts should review a statute
under the Utah "reasonable tendency" standard when applicable.
Lee, 867 P.2d at 582 n. 15; Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d at
890; Pharris, 846 P.2d at 467.
As set forth below, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 affects
fundamental rights embodied in the state and federal
constitutions.

Therefore, a strict scrutiny standard applies.

In the event the Court is reluctant to apply the strict scrutiny
standard, the statute must be stricken under the "reasonable
tendency" standard for violating Article I, section 24 of the
Utah Constitution.
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A.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 INTERFERES WITH
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, THEREBY REQUIRING APPLICATION OF
THE STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD.
1.
Section 76-3-203.1 Creates a Sub-Class of Criminal
Defendants Stripped of Certain Fundamental Rights.
Section 76-3-203.1 creates a sub-class of defendants
(accused of rape, homicide, burglary, larceny, etc.) that is
separated in the following manner from other defendants accused
of the same criminal conduct: After a determination of guilt on
the original offense of rape, homicide, burglary, larceny, etc.,
the members of the sub-class are subjected to a separate
proceeding to determine whether they should be penalized for
associating with others.

See Point I I . C , supra.

Because the

sub-class is not entitled to a preliminary hearing in connection
with a Section 76-3-203.1 proceeding, and the state is not
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that the
members of the sub-class associated with others in connection
with criminal conduct, the lack of constitutional safeguards
ensnares and penalizes defendants merely for associating with
others.
A person is guaranteed the right to associate with others
under the First Amendment to the federal constitution.

See

N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 1498,
78 S.Ct. 1163 (1958) (recognizing that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is "an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech"). Because Section 76-3-203.1 interferes in its
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application with a particularly sensitive First Amendment value,
the legislation must be closely scrutinized to determine whether
it is necessary to a compelling state interest.

See Harper v.

Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 16 L.Ed.2d
169, 86 S.Ct. 1079 (1966); San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973).
2.
The Interests Relating to the Enactment of the
Statute Are, First, the Elimination of Gang-Related
Crime and. Second, the Conservation of Resources.
The Utah legislature seeks to impose an enhanced penalty
against defendants for associating with others in order to send a
message to organized gang members that criminal activity is not
welcomed in Utah.

See Argument, Point I.A.I., supra.

While the

elimination of gang-related crime is certainly a valid state
interest, penalizing all defendants for associating with others
is not necessary to achieving that interest.

Section 76-3-203.1

has the effect of penalizing defendants for mere association
since the statute does not require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury of criminal culpability.
In addition, according to the legislative history of Section
76-3-203.1, legislators expected and intended that the statute
would be applied in an economical manner.

Hence, the statute

eliminates the time consuming process of a preliminary hearing,
assembling a jury to hear the evidence, and presenting the
evidence in order to prove a violation of the statute beyond a
reasonable doubt.

While the conservation of resources appears to

be another "state interest," its interference with a
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constitutional right cannot be justified unless the state can
show that conserving resources is "urgently and overwhelmingly
necessary."
(Utah 1989).

Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 363
Since the state cannot make such a showing, the

statute is unconstitutional.
B.
THE CLASSIFICATIONS CREATED BY SECTION 76-3-203.1
ARE NOT BASED ON DIFFERENCES THAT HAVE A REASONABLE
TENDENCY TO FURTHER THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STATUTE.
Even if the "strict scrutiny" analysis is not applicable to
Section 76-3-203.1, the statute is unconstitutional under Utah's
"reasonable tendency" standard.

The first prong of the Utah

analysis requires laws to apply equally to all persons within a
class.

As set forth in Point IV.A.1., supra, Section 76-3-203.1

fails that prong, because it creates a sub-class of defendants
subjected to an enhanced sentence for associating with others.
Since the enhanced sentencing scheme fails the first prong, in
order to be valid under the Utah standard, it must have a
"reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute."
Malan, 693 P.2d at 670 (emphasis added).

As set forth above, the

primary objective of Section 76-3-203.1 is to get ganglords off
the streets.
However, gang-related activity is not addressed in the
statute, nor are the most traditional notions of "gangs."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995).
a "criminal street gang" as follows:
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See

The California Act describes

[A]ny ongoing organization, association, or group of
three or more persons, whether formal or informal,
having as one of its primary activities the commission
of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in [the
Act], having a common name or common identifying sign
or symbol, and whose members individually or
collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity.
Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(f) (West). Utah legislators describe a
gang as a group of youth with common signs or signals.
Argument, Point I.A.I., supra.

See

Those characteristics are not

identified in the statute.
If the gang enhancement statute tends to eliminate gangrelated crimes, the tendency is muddied and obscured by the broad
language of the statute and is more "fanciful than real."
693 P.2d at 673.

Malan,

In reality, the reasonable tendency of the

statute is to enhance the criminal sentence of those persons who
have no gang relations or to enhance the sentence of the gang
follower, those members of the gang who are easily influenced or
led by the ganglord, thereby casting doubt on what the
legislature actually intended to do.

The classification must

rest on some difference which "'bears a reasonable and just
relation to the act in respect to which the classification is
proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such
basis."

Malan, 693 P.2d at 671 (quoting Gulf, Colorado & Santa

Fe Railway v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159, 17 S. Ct. 255, 258, 41
L.Ed. 666 (1897)).

Because there is no rational relationship

between the objective of locking up ganglords and a statute that
enhances the sentences of persons who have no gang relations,
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Section 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional under the "rational
tendency" analysis.
REASONS WHY ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED AND OPINION
ISSUED.
Application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 raises important
federal and state constitutional questions of first impression.
As set forth above, the statute requires evidence of the criminal
defendant's culpable mental state, thereby entitling a criminal
defendant to a preliminary hearing, to the presumption of
innocence until each element of the statute is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, and to a jury.
Because the Utah legislature has carved out those rights in
connection with a determination that the defendant violated
Section 76-3-203.1, the statute violates specific state
constitutional provisions, the state and federal due process
clauses, the state uniform operation of the laws provision and
the federal equal protection provision.

Oral argument and a

published opinion would remind prosecutors and trial courts of
the reach of important constitutional provisions, and would send
a message to them to discontinue application of the statute so
long as it violates fundamental rights.
CONCLUSION
Cheeney respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
enhanced penalty imposed against him on the basis that Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 violates the federal and state constitutions in
the following manners:

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 violates
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Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution by interfering
with a criminal defendant's right to a preliminary hearing in
connection with a proceeding to determine whether the statute has
been violated; it violates Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution by carving out a criminal defendant's right to a
jury in a proceeding to determine whether the statute has been
violated; it violates a criminal defendant's fundamental right to
the presumption of innocence until each element of the statute is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt; it is void for vagueness in
violation of the federal due process provision; it violates the
state due process provision; it violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the federal constitution; and it violates the Uniform
Operation of Laws provision of the Utah Constitution.
SUBMITTED this

/^fet day of February, 1996.

LINDA M. JONES J
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

REBECCA HYDE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

I N T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H
THE STATE OF UTAH.
JUDGMENT
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,
vs.

G^Wrh<W^

CW^PVQA

4 ^
Defendant.

5*

Case No. .
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter _
Bailiff
Date

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of
impose sentence accordingly is D granted 0 denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
aving been convicted by D a jury; D the court; )*f plea of guilty;
should not be imposed, and defendant having
D plea of no contesfrof the offense of
&ti?<Aft?\k
_ _ , a felony
v
ofthP y ^ p g r ^ t f ^ f f a
ftlass^
misrtemgannr,
meanorSoeing hqy/ present in court and ready for sentence and
represented h y( ^ . V\v!u3sfl-^ apd the State being represented by ^ L * TSrVyVL^is now adjudged guilty
of the above^oWise, isjTfly^-serttenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
^ n o t to exceed five years; ^>\cf_ ^ v \ ^ < i r \ N ^ C C - ^ ^ \ ^ ( ^ & - WtCrfL. 'Si.j
D of not less than one year nor more "than fifteen years;
^\
D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed
years;
O and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
**
»
v
^ a n d ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ t o \ f t C f t t to A 9 ? T ^ ; ^ " ^ * » **>!<£ T V \ Q i y ^ A g r a A a r

IT?

Ccot*
*2L
pV-Vcy * V i W 5 >

such sentence is to run concurrently with
fe«\)^g
such sentence is to run consecutively with
^ _
vt » i
upon motion o f X S t a t e » D Defense, D Court, r n i i n t ( s ) 3 - 3 ^ fl.ft*&^*\bb%J\bvft* hereby dismissed
G Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
}sf Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
Commitment shall issue
ATi
DATED this _i£li^9ay of

X

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

Page

0.JL

ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR COMMISSION OF CRIME IN CONCERT
WITH TWO OR MORS PERSONS
STATS OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

VS.

qg\QOUi»Qq FS

COUNT NO. __}

%

Defendant.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 76-3-203.1, the Court
finds the defendant having been adjudged guilty is subject to an
enhanced penalty as provided in that section in that the defendant
committed said offense in concert with two or more persons.
Therefore, it is ordered that the defendant be confined and
imprisoned at the

/\ Utah State Prison, or

Salt Lake County

Jail, to an enhanced minimum term as provided by law of:
90 days
180 days
X. 3 years
6 years
9 years
20 years
•Such sentence shall run consecutively and not concurrently vith
the basic sentence set forth in the original Commitment and
Dated t hn.
i sJ

Page ^ o f
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IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H
THE STATE OF UTAH.
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.
vs.

^vS^Vr^Tx£5?

OrvULENE-O

5

Defendant.

Case No. .
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter _
Bailiff
Date

ft.. ?wMlx>

A. ryre
9. ftftt^Vv
/V*. ary w r

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is • granted a denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having beqn convicted by a a jury; 0 the court; V plea of guilty;
O plea of no contest; of the offense of
*T^<L^rV»
a felony
of the
egree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by V M V \ U A & - - , and the State being represented by ^ . T T N M <^ j S now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is noV sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed five years;
\
^ o f not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; ^C^> Q ^ ^ r Q ^ V . ^ v C i l ^ r ^ ^ X L
D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
^
^
O not to exceed
years;
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of *
.
}tf and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to
(*-_£& ( V > O N \ ^
\ J

Pf**fr

v ^ ~ 9^$*~ ^
* v^

m

*\

^ such sentence is to run concurrently with
c
such sentence is TO
to run consecutively witn
with
r W o r ^ g OA g * r*:c *** ^ \ ^ v
* c ^ *^ < r u " ±
upon motion o f ^ S t a t e . Q Defense. D Court. C o u n t ( s ) 3 - 3 ^ C * e * * \ t f t f l * f e & Vmmhy d i s m i s s ^
O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
* V Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake CountyJ^for delivery to the Utah State
Prison. Draper. Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
X Commitment shall issue
DATED this

pLi^Tday of
/

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
,DISTEt£f COURT JUDGE
Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

/
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ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR COMMISSION OF CRIME IN CONCERT
WITH TWO OR MORS PERSONS
STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NO. qSWOUoQq F S

Plaintiff,
vs.

COUNT NO.

^

(^gJtoWs* CV\eAX\i
T
Defendant.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 76-3-203.1, the Court
finds the defendant having been adjudged guilty is subject to an
enhanced penalty as provided in that section in that the defendant
committed said offense in concert with two or more persons.
Therefore, it is ordered that the defendant be confined and
imprisoned at the

X

Utah State Prison, or

Salt Lake County

Jail, to an enhanced minimum term as provided by law of:
90 days
180 days
• •• 3 years
X 6 years
9 years
20 years
*Such sentence shall run consecutively and not concurrently with
the basic sentence set forth in the original Commitment and
Judgment.
.

Dated tiiis_j/M^Y
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ADDENDUM B

76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — -jciiemeni 01 wie
offense" defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense* mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense
but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence.

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission
of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mentai state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct

76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons
— Enhanced penalties.
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense
as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned,
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive
offense charged.
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons,
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the omission.
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are:
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in
prison.

(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c,
regarding drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses underjntlejfe^Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except iSections
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 766-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and
76-6-520;
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307,
76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in
Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety
Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an
enhanced penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence
required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the
record and in writing.

77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts.
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court,
questions of fact by the jury.
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate,
unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the
State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment.
The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

ADDENDUM C

Chapter 11
STREET TERRORISM ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION ACT
Section
186.20.
186.21.
186.22.

186.22a.

Section
Citation.
Legislative findings and declaration.
Participation in criminal street gang;
punishment; felony conviction; sentence enhancement; commission on or
near school grounds; pattern of criminal gang activity.
Buildings or places used by criminal
street gangs; nuisance; additional
remedies; confiscation of firearms or

186.23.
186.24.
186.25.
18626.
18627.
186.28.

deadly or dangerous weapons owned
or possessed by gang members.
Mutual aid activities; labor organizations.
Severability.
Local laws; preemption.
Criminal street gang; violent coercion to
participate; offense.
Duration of chapter.
Firearms; supply, sell or give possession; participation in criminal street
gangs.

Chapter 11 mas added by Stats.1988, c 12tf, § 1, eff Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1,
eff. Sept 26, 1988.
Repeal
Chapter 11 is repealed Jan. 1, 1997, by the provisions of § 186.27.
Law Review Commentaries
Gang evidence: Issues for criminal defense. Susan L.
Burrell, 30 Santa Clara L.Rev. 739 (1990).

§ 186.20.

Citation

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "California Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act."
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.)
Additions or changes indicated by underline; deletions by asterisks * * *
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Historical and Statutory Notes
u

1988 Legislation
Section 5 of Stats.1988, c 1256, provides:
*On or before January 1, 1991, the District Attorney of
Los Angeles County and the City Attorney of the City of
Los Angeles shall submit a report to the Legislature on
the effect of this act on the control of criminal street gang
activity in the County of Los Angeles. The report shall
include, but need not be limited to, all of the following:
"(a) The number of arrests under this act
"(b) The number of prosecutions under this act

(c) The number of trials which have resulted from
prosecutions under this act, and the number of pleas
which resulted.
"(d) Tlie number of convictions under this act
"(e) The number and type of sentence enhancements
which have been sought under this act, and the number
and kind which have been ordered by the courts.
u
(f) The number of nuisance abatement actions under
this act"
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the
same session of the legislature, see Government Code
} 9606.

5 186.21. Legislative findings and declaration
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that it is the right of every person, regardless of race, color,
creed, religion, national origin, sex, age, sexual orientation, or handicap, to be secure and protected from
fear, intimidation, and physical harm caused by the activities of violent groups and individuals. It is not
the intent of this chapter to interfere with the exercise of the constitutionally protected rights of freedom
of expression and association. The Legislature hereby recognizes the constitutional right of every citizen
to harbor and express beliefs on any lawful subject whatsoever, to lawfully associate with others who
share similar beliefs, to petition lawfully constituted authority for a redress of perceived grievances, and
to participate in the electoral process.
The Legislature, however, further finds that the State of California is in a state of crisis which has been
caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes
against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods. These activities, both individually and collectively,
present a clear and present danger to public order and safety and are not constitutionally protected. The
Legislature finds that there are nearly 600 criminal street gangs operating in California, and that the
number of gang-related murders is increasing. The Legislature also finds that in Los Angeles County
alone there were 328 gang-related murders in 1986, and that gang homicides in 1987 have increased 80
percent over 1986. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to seek the eradication of
criminal activity by street gangs by focusing upon patterns of criminal gang activity and upon the
organized nature of street gangs, which together, are the chief source of terror created by street gangs.
The Legislature further finds that an effective means of punishing and deterring the criminal activities of
street gangs is through forfeiture of the profits, proceeds, and instrumentalities acquired, accumulated, or
used by street gangs.
(Added by State.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1266, § 1, efif. Sept 26, 1988.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legislation
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the
same session of the legislature, see Government Code
§ 9605.
§ 1P6.22. Participation in criminal street gang; punishment; felony conviction; sentence enhancement; commission on or near school grounds; pattern of criminal gang activity
(a) Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or
assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in
a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or
2 or 3 years.
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (4), any person who is convicted of a felony committed for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to
promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that felony,
in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he
or she has been convicted, be punished by an additional term of one, two, or three years at the court's
discretion * * *.
(2) If the underlying felony described in paragraph (1) is committed on the grounds of, or within 1,000
feet of, a public or private elementary, vocational, junior high, or high school, during hours in which the
facility is open for classes or school related programs or when minors are using the facility, the additional
term shall be two, three, or four years, at the court's discretion. * * *
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(3) The court shall order the imposition of the middle term of the sentence enhancement, unless there
are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation. The court shall state the reasons for its choice of
sentence enhancements on the record at the time of the sentencing.
(4) Any person who violates this subdivision in the commission of a felony punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison for life, shall not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served.
(c) If the court grants probation or suspends the execution of sentence imposed upon the defendant for
a violation of subdivision (a), or in cases involving a true finding of the enhancement enumerated in
subdivision (b), the court shall require that the defendant serve a minimum of 180 days in a county jail as
a condition thereof.
(d) Notwithstanding any other law, the court may strike the additional punishment for the enhancements provided in this section or refuse to impose the minimum jafl sentence for misdemeanors in an
unusual case where the interests of justice would best be served, if the court specifies on the record and
enters into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interests of justice would best be served by
that disposition.
(e) As used in this chapter, "pattern of criminal gang activity" means the commission, attempted
commission, or solicitation of two or more of the foflowing offenses, provided at least one of those offenses
occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those offenses occurred within three years
after a prior offense, and the offenses are committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons:
(1) Assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, as defined
in Section 245.
(2) Robbery, as defined in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 211) of Title 8 of Part 1.
(3) Unlawful homicide or manslaughter, as defined in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 187) of Title
8 of Part 1.
(4) The sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer for sale, or offer to manufacture
controlled substances as defined in Sections 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, and 11058 of the Health and
Safety Code.
(5) Shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle, as defined in Section 246.
(6) Discharging or permitting the discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle, as defined in
subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 12034.
(7) Arson, as defined in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 450) of Title 13.
(8) The intimidation of witnesses and victims, as defined in Section 136.1.
(9) Grand theft, as defined in Section 487, when the value of the money, labor, or real or personal
property taken exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
(10) Grand theft of any vehicle, trailer, or vessel, as described in Section 487h.
(11) Burglary, as defined in Section 459.
(12) Rape, as defined in Section 261.
(13) Looting, as defined in Section 463.
(14) Moneylaundering, as defined in Section 186.10.
(15) Kidnapping, as defined in Section 207.
(16) Mayhem, as defined in Section 203.
(17) Aggravated mayhem, as defined in Section 205.
(18) Torture, as defined in Section 206.
(19) Felony extortion, as defined in Sections 518 and 520.
(20) Felony vandalism, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 594.
(21) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.
(22) The sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm as described in Section 12072.
(23) Possession of a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person in
violation of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 12101.
(f) As used in this chapter, "criminal street gang" means any ongoing organization, association, or
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the
commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (23), inclusive, of
Additions or chanaes indicated hv underline: deletions bv asterisks * * *
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subdivision (e), having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.
(g) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1997, and on that date is repealed.
(Added by Stats.1989, c. 930, § 5.1, operative Jan. 1, 1993. Amended by Stats.1991, c. 201 (AB.1135),
§ 1, operative Jan. 1, 1993; Stats.1991, c. 661 (A.B.1866), § 2, operative Jan. 1, 1993; Stats.1993, c. 601
(S.B.724), § 1; Stats.1993, c. 610 (AB.6), § 3, eff. Oct 1,1993; Stats.1993, c. 611 (S.B.60), § 3, eff. Oct 1,
1993; Statl993, c. 1125 (AB.1630), § 3; Stats.1994, c. 47 (S.B.480), § 1, eff. April 19,1994; Stats.1994, c
451 (A.B.2470), § 1; Stats.1995, c. 377 (S.B.1095), § 2.)
Repeal
Section 186.22 is repealed by its own terms on Jan 1, 1997.
Historical and Statutory Notes
1989 Legislation
Section 12.5 of Stats.1989, c. 930 provides:
"Sections 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 8.1, 9.1, and 11.1 of this act shall
become operative on January 1, 1993, unless a later
enacted statute, which is enacted before January 1, 1993,
changes that date."
1991 Legislation
The 1991 amendment inserted the provision relating to
the additional term imposed when the underlying felony is
committed on the grounds of or within 1,000 feet of
certain schools; and added provisions relating to the
operative date and the repeal of the section.
Effect of amendment of section by two or more acts at
the same session of the legislature, see Government Code
$ 9606.
1992 Legislation
Former § 186.22, added by Stato.1988, c 1242, $ 1;
Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, amended by Stats.1989, c 144,
§ 1; Stats.1989, c. 930, § 5; Stats.1991, c 661 (AB.1866),
§ 1, relating to similar subject matter, was repealed by its
own terms effective Jan. 1, 1993.
1993 Legislation
The 1993 amendment by c 611 inserted subd (eX8)
relating to carjacking.
Section affected by two or more acts at the same
session of the legislature, see Government Code § 9605.
Amendments of this section by §§ 3.02, 3.06, 3.08, 3.09,
3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 of Stats.
1993, c. 611, failed to become operative under the provisions of § 41 of that Act
Amendments of this section by §§ 3.02, 3.06, 3.08, 3.09,
3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 of Stats.
1993 c. 610, failed to become operative under the provisions of § 36 of that Act
The 1993 amendment by c 1125 added subd. (eX8)
relating to grand theft of a vehicle; deleted former subd.
(e)(8), which read "Carjacking, as defined in Section 215";
deleted subd (g) which provided an operative date of Jan.
1, 1993; redesignated as subd. (g) former subd. (h); in
subd. (g), deleted "unless a later enacted statute which is
enacted before January 1, 1997, deletes or extends that
date"; and made other nonsubstantive changes.
1994 Legislation
The 1994 amendment, by c. 47, in subd. (a), substituted
"16 months, or 2 or 3 years" for "one, two, or three
years"; in subd. (b)(1), deleted "which is" Mowing "who

is convicted of a felony"; rewrote subd. (c); in subd. (d),
deleted "provision or following "Notwithstanding any other"; in subd. (e), redesignated as pars. (7) and (8) former
pars. (6) and (7), inserted par. (6) relating to discharge of
afirearmfroma motor vehicle, redesignated as par. (10)
former par. (8), and inserted pars. (9) and (11) to (21)
relating, respectively, to grand theft exceeding $10,000,
burglary, rape, looting, money laundering, kidnapping,
mayhem, aggravated mayhem, torture, felony extortion,
felony vandalism and carjacking; and in subd. (f), substituted "(21)" for "(8)", substituted "having" for "which has"
following "subdivision (e)" and inserted "and" following
"symbol,". Prior to amendment, subd. (c) read:
"(c) Any person who is convicted of a public offense
punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor, which is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, any criminal street gang, with the specific intent
to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by
gang members, shall be punished by imprisonment in a
county jafl not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in
the state prison for one, two, or three years, provided that
any person sentenced to imprisonment in a county jafl
shall be imprisoned for a period not to exceed one year,
but not less than 180 days, and shall not be eligible for
release upon completion of sentence, parole, or any other
basis, until he or she has served 180 dayB. If the court
grants probation or suspends the execution of sentence
imposed upon the defendant, it shall require as a condition
thereof that the defenaant serve 180 days in a county
jafl."
The 1994 amendment by c. 451 added subd. (eX22)
relating to sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm; and
added subd. (eX23) relating to possession.
The 1994 amendment of this section by c. 451 (A.B.2470)
explicitly amended the 1994 amendment of this section by
c 47 (S.B.480).
Section 17 of Stats.1994, c 451 (A.B.2470), provides:
"This bill shall become operative only if Assembly BiD
2428 of the 1993-94 Regular Session of the Legislature
(Stats.1994, c. 454] is chaptered and becomes effective on
or before January 1, 1995."
1995 Legislation
The 1995 amendment, in subd (b)(1), substituted "paragraph (4)" for "paragraph (2)"; in subd. (b), inserted
paragraph designations (2) and (3); in subd. (b)(2), inserted "described in paragraph (1)" following "felony"; redesignated as subd. (bX4) former subd. (bX2); and made
nonsubstantive changes throughout

Cross References
Firearm possession during street gang crimes, sentence
enhancement, see Penal Code § 12021.5.
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Code of Regulations References

Gang, definition, see 15 CaL Code of Regs. § 3000.
Law Review Commentaries
Review of selected 1989 California legislation. 21 Pac.
LJ. 425 (1990).
Review of selected 1993 California legislation. 25 Pac
LJ. 513 (1994).

Review of selected 1994 California legislation. 26 Pac.
LJ. 202 (1995).

Library References
California Jury Instructions-Criminal [CALJIC].

United States Supreme Court
Death penalty, admissibility of evidence, gang membership, freedom of association, see Dawson v. Delaware,

1992,112 S.Ct 1093,117 L.Ed.2d 309, on remand 608 A^d
1201, appeal after remand 637 AAi 57.
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Expert testimony 7.6
Gang purposes or benefit 9
Injunction 12
Instructions 11
Ongoing organization 3
Pattern of activity 3£
Predicate offense 7
Presumptions and burden of proof 2
Primary activity 4
Sufficiency of evidence 8
Validity 1
L Validity
"Benefit" as used in statute providing for sentence
enhancement for defendant convicted of felony as criminal
street gang member where felony is for benefit of street
gang was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when
term was read in conjunction with statute's qualifying
language so as to limit scope to only those acts committed
with specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members. In re Alberto R.
(App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 Cal.App.3d
1309.
Phrase "and the last of those offenses occurred within
three years after a prior offense," which was part of
definition of "pattern of criminal gang activity" contained
in Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, was
not unconstitutionaDy vague or overbroad, despite defendant's anticipated scenarios in which gang members could
be charged for crimes in future of which they had no
knowledge and in which they did not participate. In re
Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 CaLRptr.2d 348, 236
CaLApp.3d 1309.
"Primary activities" as used in statutory definition of
"criminal street gang" whose members could receive sentence enhancement if convicted of felony as member was
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad despite contention that enforcement would be arbitrary based on who
made decision of what gang's primary activities were;
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, of
which phrase was part, specifically listed felonious conduct

required to invoke its provisions. In re Alberto R. (App.
4 Dist 1991) 1 CaLRpti\2d 348, 236 CaLApp.3d 1309.
"Promote, further, or assist" as used in statute providing for sentence enhancement for defendant convicted of
felony as criminal street gang member was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad inasmuch as phrase had
been consistently used by courts to describe aiding and
abetting. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 CaL
Rptr^d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d 1309.
Statute making it offense to actively participate in
criminal street gang activity and providing for sentence
enhancement based on that activity is not unconstitutionally overbroad In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1
CaLRptr^d 348, 236 CaLApp^d 1309.
Statute providing for sentence enhancement for defendant convicted of felony as criminal street gang member
did not violate equal protection despite defendant's characterization of enhancement as being similar to crime of
conspiracy, which included procedural safeguards that
enhancement did not; conspiracy required agreement
with others to commit offense, while enhancement statute
required active participation in felonious criminal gang
activity, and defendant subject to enhancement was not
similarly situated to defendant charged with conspiracy.
In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235
CaLApp.3d 1309.
Statutory provision pursuant to which defendant convicted of felony as criminal street gang member was
subject to sentence enhancement if felony was convicted
with "specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members" provided adequate
notice of what conduct was proscribed and was not unconstitutionaDy vague. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1
Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 Cal.App.3d 1309.
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act and
its provision for sentence enhancement for defendant convicted of felony as criminal street gang member did not
vest unfettered discretion; Act specifically designated
crimes in which gang had to be involved In re Alberto R.
(App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 Cal.App.3d
1309.
When narrowly construed to pertain only to conduct
that was purely felonious, Le., punishable in state prison,
phrase "felonious criminal conduct" as used in statute
making it offense to promote, further, or assist such
conduct by gang members was not unconstitutionally
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vague or overbroad In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991)
1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d 1309.
Sentence enhancement for "membership* in criminal
street gang was not unconstitutionally vague. People v.
Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235 Cal.
App.3d 967.
Sentence enhancement provision for crimes committed
in association with criminal street gang, with specific
intent to promote, further or assist in mminal conduct of
members of gang, did not violate due process, even though
it did not require proof that defendant was aware of
predicate offenses committed by other gang members.
People v. Games (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894,235
Cal.App.3d 957.
Sentence enhancement provision for participation in
"criminal street gang" was not unconstitutionally overbroad; statute regulated criminal conduct, not speech or
association, and there was no right of association to
engage in mminal conduct People v. Gamez (App. 4
Dist 1991) 286 Cal.Rptr. 894, 235 CaJApp.3d 957.
Sentence enhancement provision for participation in
"criminal street gang" was not unconstitutionally vague;
statutory definition clarified that it was not mere association with others, but rather association with others for
purpose of committing crime, where association's very
existence was founded upon commission of crime, that was
prohibited People v. Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286
CaLRptr. 894, 235 CaLApp.3d 957.
Fact that terms of this section were not perfectly
defined or may not have been defined precisely did not
invalidate section under due process clause. People v.
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL
App.3d692.
The term "criminal street gang," as used in this section
was sufficiently defined and did not render section unconstitutionally vague under due process clause; section did
not make it criminal to be member of undefined "gang"
but prohibited membership in criminal street gang which
was defined as any ongoing organization, association, or
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission
of one or more enumerated criminal acts. People v.
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL
App.3d 692.
The phrase "knowledge of pattern of criminal gang
activity" was not unconstitutionally vague under due process clause; term "knowledge" was often used in criminal
law meaning awareness of particular facts proscribed in
criminal statutes and "pattern of criminal gang activity"
was defined in this section. People v. Green (App. 1 Dist
199P 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaLApp.3d 692.
The phrase '^rillfully promotes, furthers, or assists in
any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang"
was not unconstitutionally vague under due process
clause; similarity of phrase with that employed in determining if person is aider and abettor indicated that phrases should be viewed as anonymous. People v. Green
(App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 Cal.Rptr. 140, 227 CalApp.3d 692.
Although phrase "felonious criminal conduct," had some
uncertainty, it could be construed to cover only conduct
which was clearly felonious, i.e., which amounted to commission of offense punishable by imprisonment in state
prison and, as so construed, this section was not unconstitutionally vague under due process clause. People v.
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 Cal.Rptr. 140, 227 CaL
App.3d 692.

Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228
CaLApp.3d 990.
1.8. In general
Mere membership in street gang is not a crime. People
ex reL Gallo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist 1996) 40 Cai.Rptr.2d
589, 34 CaLApp.4th 136, review granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRpto\2d 680, 899 P.2d 66.
2.

Presumptions and burden of proof
In prosecution for criminal street gang offense or when
state is seeking mminal street gang sentence enhancement it is incumbent upon prosecution to prove through
competent evidence the elements of a criminal street gang
as set out in the statute, including the offenses necessary
to satisfy the pattern requirement People v. Gardeley
(App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 136,30 CaLApp.4th 402,
34 Cal.App.4th 1614, review granted and opinion superseded 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 890 P.2d 1115.
In prosecution for criminal street gang offense or when
state is seeking criminal street gang sentence enhancement, while a gang expert can give opinion as to whether
predicate crime was act in furtherance of gang activities if
such testimony on ultimate issue would assist trier of fact,
if, as a basis for that opinion, expert is not relying on facts
he had observed, or of which he had personal knowledge,
or that were given to him as an assumption from evidence
introduced in the case, his testimony can only be eKcited
in the form of hypothetical question, and that opinion, in
turn, stands or falls depending, initially, upon whether
trier of fact finds assumed facts to be true or false from
evidence introduced to establish existence of such facta.
People v. Gardeley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 186,
30 Cal.App.4th 402, 34 CaLApp.4th 1614, review granted
and opinion superseded 39 CaLRptr^d 406,890 P^d 1116.
For mminal street gang sentence enhancement to be
found true, there must be substantial evidence to support
finding of existence of "criminal street gang" members
engaged in "pattern of criminal gang activity." Matter of
Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282 CaLRptr. 75, 230 CaL
App.3d 1455, review denied
Pattern of criminal gang activity used to support sentence enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not
require that the pattern of criminal street gang activity be
shown by instances of purposeful gang activity. In re
Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228
Cal.App.3d 990.
Enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not require
proof of two different offenses rather than two instances
of the same offense. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist
1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990.
3.

Ongoing organization
Element of "criminal street gang" for sentence enhancement pursuant to California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act that there be an ongoing
organization of three or more persons was met by testimony of juvenile witnesses identifying at least three participants in particular incident as members of a street gang,
testimony that there was a membership roll written on a
wall, and that members, friends, and supporters of the
group were capable of concerted action. In re Nathaniel
C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d
990.
3.5. Pattern of activity
Pattern of criminal gang activity element of offense of
participating in criminal street gang does not require
proof of prior enumerated offense, but rather may be
based on incident for which defendant is on trial People
v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33
Cal.App.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review

1.5. Due process
Due process requires pleading enhancement under this
chapter and requires proof of each fact required In re
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gang. People v. Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr.
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptrJ2d 678, 899
P.2d64.
140, 227 CaLAppAl 692.
The terms "actively participate" and "membership"
Single incident, even incident on which current prosecugang were not unconstitutionally vague under due process
tion is based, can provide factual basis to find pattern of
clause; term "member'* had ordinary meaning and had
criminal gang activity required to support conviction for
also been judicially defined to mean a person who bears
participating in criminal street gang. People v. Loeun
relationship to organization that is not accidentaL artificial
(App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th
or unconsciously in appearance only and the phrase "ac1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review granted
tively participate," in context, had same meaning as "acand opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 678, 899 P.2d 64.
tive membership* as defined by case law. People v.
Evidence supportedfindingof pattern of criminal gang
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL
activity required to support defendant's conviction for
App.3d 692.
participating in criminal street gang, based on predicate
offenses of two separate assaults with deadly weapons by
6. Common name or identifying symbol
gang members; defendant hit victim with bat and another
Association of multiple names with a gang satisfies
member of same gang hit victim numerous times with
requirement of this chapter that the gang have a common
long, thin object People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40
name or common identifying sign or symbol, as long as at
Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125,
least one name is common to the gang's members. In re
as modified, review granted and opinion superseded 43
Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228
Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 899 P.2d 64.
Cal.App.3d 990.
Under "continuous course of conduct" exception to unaElement of criminal street gang for sentence enhancenimity requirement, jurors did not have to unanimously
ment purposes pursuant to California Street Terrorism
agree on which two of several possible predicate offenses
Enforcement and Prevention Act that the organization
established that gang had engaged in pattern of criminal
have a common name or common identifying sign or
activity, and thus was "criminal street gang,* in order to
symbol was met by evidence that its members were
find defendant guilty of knowingly participating in crimitaiown by two names and that there was graffiti which
nal street gang and to impose enhanced punishment based
signified the gang, although no particular color or clothing
onfindingthat murder was committed in association with was associated with gang membership. In re Nathaniel
such gang; pertinent element of definition of criminal
C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d
street gang, Le., organization whose members engage in
990.
"pattern of crimina) gang activity," contemplated continuous course of conduct People v. Funes (App. 1 Dist
7. Predicate offense
1994) 28 CaLRptr .2d 758, 23 CaLApp.4th 1506, modified on
"Pattern of criminal gang activity" cannot be estabdenial of rehearing, review denied
lished for sentence enhancement purposes by use of predicate crimes that occur after the crime for which the
4. Primary activity
defendant is being tried. People v. Godinez (App. 2 Dist
Requirement for enhancement of sentence pursuant to
1993) 22 CaLRptr^d 164, 17 CaLApp.4th 1363, review
this chapter that the primary activity of the street gang at
denied
issue be criminal activity is a proper subject of expert
For purposes of juvenile proceeding, robbery, murder,
opinion. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279
and attempted murder ofrivalgang member were crimes
CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990.
committed on "separate occasions" within meaning of
Testimony by police officer, qualified as an expert, that
criminal street gang sentence enhancement statute, since
primary activity of all the gangs in his area was criminal
juvenile had reasonable opportunity to reflect on actions
and that one of the crimes they committed was assault
in eight hours between robbery and attempted murder.
with a deadly weapon was insufficient to show that particMatter of Jose T. (App. * Dist 1991) 282 CaLRptr. 75, 230
ular gang whose conduct was at issue with respect to
Cal.App.3d 1455, review denied.
enhancement pursuant to this chapter had criminal activiFor purpose of juvenile proceeding, robbery, murder
ty as a primary activity; expert did not identify the gang
as one of the gangs in his area and the list of crimes which and attempted murder which were committed by two or
more persons constituted qualifying predicate offenses for
he said gangs commit included only one of the eight
offenses specified in the statute. In re Nathaniel C. (App. imposition of street gang sentencing enhancement pursuant to requirement that predicate offenses must have been
1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990.
committed on separate occasions or by two or more
Fozus of this chapter is narrower than general criminal persons. Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282
conduct; evidence supporting enhancement pursuant to
CaLRptr. 75, 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, review denied.
the Act must establish that a primary activity of the gang
If there had been competent proof that one member of
is one or more of listed offenses. In re Nathaniel C. (App.
gang
had shot another, that would have sufficed to show a
1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990.
predicate offense for a pattern of criminal gang activity
under the enhancement provisions of this chapter; this
5. Active participation
section does not exempt from its scope those predicate
Sentence enhancement provision for "active particoffenses committed by gang members as part of internal
ipation" in criminal street gang was not unconstitutionally
gang disputes or power struggles. In re Nathaniel C.
vague; to be convicted, defendant must have more than
(App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CalApp.3d 990.
nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical relationship
with gang, and person must devote aU, or substantial part
Enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not require
of his time and efforts to aiminal street gang. People v.
that each predicate offense be committed by two or more
Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235 Cal.
persons; it requires only that the offenses be committed
App.3d 957.
on separate occasions or be committed by two or more
persons. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279
To be convicted of being active participant in street
CaLRptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990.
gang, defendant must have relationship with criminal
street gang which is more than nominal, passive, inactive
Evidence established time that predicate offenses for
or purely technical, and defendant must devote all, or
enhancement of sentence pursuant to this chapter occurred; evidence showed that one of the offenses was
substantial part of his time and efforts to criminal street
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incident on October 12, 1989, which gave riae to charges
against juvenile and that a second assault by gang members occurred ua few months" before the March 1990
hearing, thus showing that at least one of the predicate
offenses occurred after September 23, 1988, the effective
date of the chapter, and that one predicate offense occurred within three years of the first In re Nathaniel C.
(App. 1 Dist. 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990.
7,5. Admissibility of evidence
Hearsay from police report* and conversations with
investigating officers concerning charged incident, as well
as other information gathered by police in field, is reasonable basis for officer's expert opinion on matters related to
aiminal street gang, but officer may not simply recite
what he was told and must provide foundational testimony
for opinions which is sufficiently corroborated by other
competent physical and testimonial evidence. People v.
Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CaL
App.4th 1509, 38 Cal.App.4th 1125, as modified, review
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 678, 899
P.2d64.
Other acts evidence of defendant's gang related activities was admissible to reveal circumstances of first-degree
murder and to prove street gang enhancement; the evidence was not directed at disposition to commit other
crimes. People v. Martin (App. 6 Dist 1994) 28 CaL
Rptr.2d 660, 23 CaLApp.4th 76, modified on denial of
rehearing, review denied.
7.6. Expert testimony
Expert witness had reasonable basis to give testimony
and opinions that assaults with deadly weapons were one
of primary activities of gang, for purposes of establishing
offense of participation in criminal street gang, in light of
expert's background and training, personal knowledge and
experience with gang of which defendant was alleged to
be member, information gathered from contact and conversations with members of gang, and information contained in police department's files. People v. Loeun (App.
6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th 1509, 38
Cal.App.4th 1125, as modified, review granted and opinion
superseded 48 CaLRptr.2d 678, 899 P.2d 64.
Fact that expert witness relied in part on hearsay about
particular incident did not render improper or inadmissible expert's opinion that assaults with deadly weapons
were one of primary activities of gang, for purposes of
establishing offense of participation in criminal street
gang, in light of expert's further reliance on personal
knowledge, observations, experience and investigation,
and in light of particularity of hearsay used by expert.
People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33
CaL\pp.4th 1509, 38 Cal.App.4th 1125, as modified, review
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr\2d 678, 899
P.2d64.
8. Sufficiency of evidence
Opinion of expert witness coupled with circumstances of
alleged attack by defendant and other gang members
supported finding that one of street gang's primary activities was commission of assaults with deadly weapons,
which thus supported conviction for participating in criminal street gang; expert explained motivation of gang to
commit assaults and gang's history of assaults, and
charged incident involved apparent attempt to protect
gang's turf. People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40
Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 Cal.App.4th 1509, 38 Cal.App.4th 1125,
as modified, review granted and opinion superseded 43
Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 899 P.2d 64.
Expert testimony of police officer, who investigated
murder and had experience with gangs, that murder
benefited one gang because it promoted the respect of

that gang was sufficient to establish that murder was
committed for the benefit of the gang, for purposes of
criminal 3treet gang enhancement People v. Olguin
(App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596, 31 CaLApp.4th
1355, rehearing denied, review denied.
Gang expert's opinion hearsay testimony that facts underlying prior convictions involved gang-related crimes
was insufficient to support convictions of criminal street
gang offenses and criminal street gang sentence enhancements; expert's testimony regarding facts underlying convictions not elicited in form of hypothetical question was
secondhand testimony which could not constitute substantia] evidence that required predicate offense by gang
member occurred, and expert's opinion testimony elicited
in form of hypothetical questions was not supported by
competent evidence establishing existence of the facts
upon which the hypothetical questions were based People v. Gardeley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 136, 30
CaLApp.4th 402, 34 Cal.App.4th 1614, review granted and
opinion superseded 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 890 ?2d 1115.
Enhancement of attempted murder defendant's sentence on ground that crime was committed in association
with criminal street gang was sufficiently supported by
evidence that predicate offenses committed by other gang
members were gang related and that intended victim of
instant offense was member of rival gang who had recentr
ly been involved in shooting of member of defendant's
gang. People v. Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr.
894, 235 CaLApp.Sd 967.
Conclusion^ testimony that gang members had previously engaged in enumerated offenses, based on nonspecific hearsay and arrest information which does not specify exactly who, when, where, and under what circumstances gang crimes were committed, does not constitute
substantial evidence necessary far criminal street gang
sentencing enhancement Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dist
1991) 282 CaLRptr. 75, 280 CaLApp.3d 1455, review denied.
Where evidence failed to show that more than one
member of street gang engaged in commission or attempted commission of assault with a deadly weapon on particular occasion, although others were present, that incident
could not establish pattern of criminal gang activity required for enhancement of sentence pursuant to this
chapter. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279
CaLRptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990.
Evidence established proof of commission or attempted
commission of assault with a deadly weapon by a member
of street gang for purposes of sentence enhancement
pursuant to this chapter, evidence showed that one admitted member of gang was armed with segment of a stairway rail and that he got out of a van approximately 80 feet
away from members of another gang and gave chase while
still armed with the handrail and that he admitted that if
he had caught one of the other gang members, "I guess he
would have just got beat" In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1
Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CalApp.3d 990.
Police officer's testimony which consisted of only nonspecific hearsay of suspected shooting of one gang member by another was insufficient to establish predicate
offense for sentence enhancement pursuant to this chapter. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr.
236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990.
Evidence was not sufficient to support finding that
group infant participated with was a "criminal street
gang^ and thus was not sufficient to support finding that
infant was guilty of offense of participation in a criminal
street gang; there was no evidence to show a pattern of
criminal gang activity by the infant's group, as there was
no evidence in record to establish that the charged offense
occurred within three years after a prior offense which
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was committed on a separate occasion, or by two or more
gang members. In re Lincoln J. (App. 2 Dist 1990) 272
Cal.Rptr. 852, 223 CaLApp.3d 322.
Infant's adjudication of guilt for offense of assault by
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury could
not be enhanced under subd. (bXD of this section, where
there was insufficient evidence to support finding of
"criminal street gang." In re Lincoln J. (App. 2 Dist
1990) 272 CaLRptr. 862, 223 CaLApp^d 322.
In order for a criminal street gang sentence enhancement to be sustained the court must find the existence of
"criminal street gang" and the record must contain substantia] evidence to support that finding. In re Lincoln J.
(App. 2 Dist 1990) 272 CaLRptr. 852, 223 CaLApp.3d 322.
"Expert testimony" by member of police department
youth gang task force that gang to which juvenile allegedly belonged had engaged in sale of rock cocaine, committed vehicle theft, and been involved in assault with deadly
weapon was not substantial evidence that gang was engaged in ''pattern of criminal gang activity"; testimony
was based on nonspecific hearsay and arrest information
and fell far short of requisite of this section. In re Leland
D. (App. 5 Dist 1990) 272 CaLRptr. 709, 223 CaLAppJd
251.
9.

Gang purposes or benefit
Evidence supported jury finding that murder was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with specific intent to
promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by
gang members and, thus, supported criminal street gang
enhancement; shooting was precipitated by crossing out
gang graffiti, replacing it with the name of another gang,
and then shouting that gang's name to rival gang members. People v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 CaLRpfcj\2d
596,31 CaLApp.4th 1355, rehearing denied, review denied
For purposes of statute setting forth punishment for
person who actively participates in any criminal street
gang and willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any
felonious criminal conduct by members of a gang, a pattern of gang activity may include charged crime. People
v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596, 31
CaLApp.4th 1355, rehearing denied, review denied
In prosecution for criminal street gang offense or when
state is seeking criminal street gang sentence enhancement, it must be shown that predicate crimes were gang
related, as statute requires prosecution to prove that gang
has as one of its primary activities the commission of one
or more of eight enumerated offenses. People v. Gardeley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 CaLRptr^d 136, 30 CaLApp.4th
402, 34 Cal.App.4th 1614, review granted and opinion
superseded 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 890 P.2d 1115.
Robbery, murder, and attempted murder of rival gang
member were committed for gang purposes within meaning of criminal street gang sentence enhancement imposed
in juvenile proceeding; robbery was committed by gang
members for purpose of later drive-by shooting, and murder and attempted murder was directed at members of
rival gangs. Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282
CaLRptr. 75, 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, review denied
10. Bifurcation
Defendant was not entitled to bifurcation of murder
trial and enhancement for gang activity, enhancement
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concerned mental element present in commission in the
underlying crime, and same witnesses and much of same
evidence used to prove murder were also relevant to
establish circumstances and intent of killing. People v.
Martin (App. 6 Dist 1994) 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 660, 23 CaL
App.4th 76, modified on denial of rehearing, review denied.
After determining that evidence of gang affiliation and
activity was relevant to prove motive, malice, premeditation, and intent with respect to murder charge against
defendant, trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of nine prior incidents of intergang
retaliation; aD incidents, even those in which defendant
was not directly involved and those involving attacks by
rival gang, were relevant to issue of defendant's motive in
attacking member of rival gang. People v. Funes (App. 1
Dist 1994) 28 CalRptr.2d 758, 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, modified on denial of rehearing, review denied.
Evidence of defer iant's gang affiliation and activity was
relevant to prove motive, malice, premeditation, and intent
with respect to murder charge against defendant and trial
court was thus justified in denying motion to sever or
bifurcate gang affiliation charges from murder charge;
evidence regarding gang affiliation and activity directly
related to defendant's motive for attacking member of
rival gang, as well as his intent in doing so. People v.
Funes (App. 1 Dist 1994) 28 CaLRptr^d 758, 23 CaL
App.4th 1506, modified on denial of rehearing, review
denied
11. Instructions
Jury could be presumed to have foDowed trial court's
instruction limiting use of hearsay about prior street gang
incident only to establish basis for expert's opinion, rather
than improperly relying on hearsay as evidence of predicate offense to establish pattern of criminal gang activity.
People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 CaLRptr^d 160, S3
Cal.App.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 678, 899
P.2d64.
Instruction defining "pattern of criminal gang activity*
within meaning of Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act did not have to include a requirement that
gang's criminal actions amount to or pose the threat of
continued criminaJ activity. People v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist
1994) 37 CaLRptr^d 596, 31 CaLApp.4th 1355, rehearing
denied, review denied
12. Injunction
Whether California Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention (STEP) Act authorized injunction issued by
trial court to abate gang activity was not an issue, even if
trial court relied on Act in error, since city, in requesting
injunction, based its complaint only on public nuisance
law. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40
Cal.Rptr.2d 589, 34 CaLApp.4th 136, review granted and
opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 680, 899 ?2d 66.
California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act is not exclusive means of enjoining street
gang activity. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist

1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 589, 34 CaL\pp.4th 136, review
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr 2d 680, 899
P.2d66.

Buildings or places used by criminal street gangs; nuisance; additional remedies;
confiscation of firearms or deadly or dangerous weapons owned or possessed by gang
members

(a) Every building or place used by members of a criminal street gang for the purpose of the
commission of the offenses listed in subdivision (c) of Section 186.22 or any offense involving dangerous or
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deadly weapons, burglary, or rape, and every building or place wherein or upon which that criminal
conduct by gang members takes place, is a nuisance which shall be eiyoined, abated, and prevented, and
for which damages may be recovered, whether it is a public or private nuisance.
(b) Any action for injunction or abatement filed pursuant to * • * subdivision (a) shall proceed
according to the provisions of Article 3 (commencing with Section 11570) of Chapter 10 of Division 10 of
the Health and Safety Code, except that all of the following shall apply:
(1) The court shall not assess a civil penalty against any person unless that person knew or should have
known of the unlawful acts.
(2) No order of eviction or closure may be entered.
(3) All injunctions issued shall be limited to those necessary to protect the health and safety of the
residents or the public or those necessary to prevent further criminal activity.
(4) Suit may not be filed until 30-day notice of the unlawful use or criminal conduct has been provided
to the owner by mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, to the last known address.
(c) No nonprofit or charitable organization which is conducting its affairs with ordinary care or skill,
and no governmental entity, shall be abated pursuant to * * * subdivisions (a) and (b).
(d) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any aggrieved person from seeking any other remedy
provided by law.
(e) (1) Any firearm, ammunition which may be used with the firearm, or any deadly or dangerous
weapon which is owned or possessed by a member of a criminal street gang for the purpose of the
commission of any of the offenses listed in subdivision (c) of Section 186.22, or the commission of any
burglary or rape, may be confiscated by any law enforcement agency or peace officer.
(2) In those cases where a law enforcement agency believes that the return of thefirearm,ammunition,
or deadly weapon confiscated pursuant to this subdivision, is or will be used in criminal street gang
activity or that the return of the item would be likely to result in endangering the safety of others, the
law enforcement agency shall initiate a petition in the superior court to determine if the item confiscated
should be returned or declared a nuisance.
(3) No firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon shall be sold or destroyed unless reasonable notice is
given to its lawful owner if his or her identity and address can be reasonably ascertained. The law
enforcement agency shall inform the lawful owner, at that person^ last known address by registered
mail, that he or she has 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice to respond to the court clerk to
confirm his or her desire for a hearing and that the failure to respond shall result in a default order
forfeiting the confiscated firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon as a nuisance.
(4) If the person requests a hearing, the court clerk shall set a hearing no later than 30 days from
receipt of that request The court clerk shall notify the person, the law enforcement agency involved, and
the district attorney of the date, time, and place of the hearing.
(5) At the hearing, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement agency or peace officer to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the seized item is or will be used in criminal street gang activity or
that return of the item would be likely to result in endangering the safety of others. All returns of
firearms shall be subject to subdivision (d) of Section 12072.
(6) If the person does not request a hearing within 30 days of the notice or the lawful owner cannot be
ascertained, the law enforcement agency may file a petition that the confiscated firearm, ammunition, or
deadly weapon be declared a nuisance. If the items are declared to be a nuisance, the law enforcement
agency shall dispose of the items as provided in Section 12028.
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988. Amended by Stats.1990, c. 223 (A.B.3485), § 1;
Stats.1991, c. 260 (S.B.809), § 1.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
visions (a) and (b)" for ttthis chapter"; and added subd (e)
relating to confiscation offirearmsor deadly or dangerous
weapons owned or possessed by criminal street gang
members.

1990 Legislation
The 1990 amendment deleted ", other than residential
buildings in which there are three or fewer dwelling
units," twice in subd. (a) following building or other
place".
1991 Legislation
The 1991 amendment in subd. (b) substituted "subdivision (a)" for "this section"; in subd. (c) substituted "subdi-
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Law Review Commentaries

Review of selected 1990 California legislation. 22 Pac.
L.J. 501 (1991).

Review of selected 1991 California legislation. 23 Pac.
LJ. 567 (1992).

Library References
California Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant, Friedman,
Garcia & Hagarty, see Guide's Table of Statutes for

chapter paragraph number references to paragraphs
discussing this section.

§ 186»23. Mutual aid activities; labor organizations
This chapter does not apply to employees engaged in concerted activities for their mutual aid and
protection, or the activities of labor organizations or their members or agents.
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legislation
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the
same session of the legislature, see Government Code
§ 9605.
Library References
California Jury Instnictions-^riminal [CALJIC1.
§ 186J24.

Severability

If any part or provision of this chapter, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of the chapter, including the application of that part or provision to other persons
or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby and shall continue in full force and effect To this end, the
provisions of this chapter are severable.
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1266, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legislation
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the
same session of the legislature, see Government Code
§ 9605.
§ 186.25. Local laws; preemption
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent a local governing body from adopting and enforcing laws
consistent with this chapter relating to gangs and gang violence. Where local laws duplicate or
supplement this chapter, this chapter shall be construed as providing alternative remedies and not as
preempting the field.
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, eff. Sept. 26, 1988.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legislation
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the
same session of the legislature, see Government Code
§ 9605.
§ 186.26.

Criminal street gang; violent coercion to participate; offense

(a) Any adult who utilizes physical violence to coerce, induce, or solicit another person who is under 18
years of age to actively participate in any criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section
186.22, the members of which engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of
Section 186.22, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for one, two, or three years.
(b) Any adult who threatens a minor with physical violence on two or more separate occasions within
any 30-day period with the intent to coerce, induce, or solicit the minor to actively participate in a
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criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 18622, the members of which engage in a
pattern of criminal gang activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for one, two, or three years or in a county jail for up to one year.
(c) A minor who is 16 years of age or older who commits an offense described in subdivision (a) or (b)
is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit prosecution'under any other provision of the law.
(e) N o person shall be convicted of violating this section based upon speech alone, except upon a
showing that the speech itself threatened violence against a specific person, that the defendant had the
apparent ability to carry out the threat, and that physical harm was imminently likely to occur.
(Added by Stats.1993, c. 557 (A.B.514), § 1.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legislation
Addition of § 18626 as part of Chapter 11, Street
Terrorism Enforcement And Prevention Act, added by
Stats. 1988, c. 1242, § 1, failed to become operative due to
addition of Chapter 11, Street Terrorism Enforcement
And Prevention Act, by Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1. See
Gov.C. § 9605.

Provisions similar to those contained in § 186.26 were
contained in § 5 of Stats.1988, c 1256. See Historical
Note under § 186.20.
1992 Legislation
Addition of this section by § 1 of Stats.1992, c. 920
(AB.2717), failed to become operative under the provisions of § 2 of that Act

§ 186.27. Duration of chapter
This chapter shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1997, and as of that date is repealed, unless a
later enacted statute, which is chaptered before January 1, 1997, deletes or extends that date.
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept. 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.
Amended by Stats.1991, c. 201 (A.B.1135), § 2.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1988 Legation

1991 Legislation

sifts^o?r i S S S ' S n S ' c S
j ^5J)5%
§ 186.28.

*» ™ - e n ^ t substitute "199T for "1992" as
the year for repeal of the chapter.

Firearms; supply, sell or give possession; participation in criminal street g a n g s

(a) Any person, corporation, or firm who shall knowingly supply, sell, or give possession or control of
any firearm to another shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail for a
term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine
and imprisonment if all of the following apply:
(1) The person, corporation, or firm has actual knowledge that the person will use the firearm to
commit a felony described in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22, while actively participating in any criminal
street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, the members of which engage in a pattern of
criminal activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22.
(2) The firearm is used to commit the felony.
(3) A conviction for the felony violation under subdivision (e) of Section 186.22 has first been obtained
of the person to whom the firearm was supplied, sold, or given possession or control pursuant to this
section.
(b) This section shall only be applicable where the person is not convicted as a principal to the felony
offense committed by the person to whom the firearm was supplied, sold, or given possession or control
pursuant to this section.
(Added by Stats.1992, c. 370 (S.B.437), § 1.)
Cross References
Firearms, supply, sell, or give possession to person
participating in criminal street gangs, see Penal Code
§ 186.28.

L a w Review Commentaries
Review of selected 1992 California legislation. 24 Pac.
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235 CalAppJd 798
Wallin, J., concurred in result and filed
opinion.
1. Criminal Law <*=>472, 476.6
Police officers could properly offer expert opinion evidence regarding attempted
murder defendant's membership in street
gang, membership of guests at victim's
residence in rival gang, and ongoing criminality of gangs, in that such issues were
matters beyond common knowledge.
West's Ann.Cal.Evid.Code § 801.
2. Criminal Law <s=»469.1
So long as expert testimony assists
trier of fact, it is proper even though it
provides evidence of elements of allegations charged.
235 Cal.App.3d 957
j ^ T h e PEOPLE, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Ralph GAMEZ, Defendant
and Appellant
No. G009572.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
Division 3.
Oct 30, 1991.
Certified For Partial Publication *
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Orange County, No. C-76286,
Luis A. Cardenas, J., of, inter alia, attempted murder, and his sentence was enhanced
on ground crime was committed in association with criminal street gang. On appeal,
the Court of Appeal, Moore, J., held that:
(1) expert opinion evidence regarding
gangs was admissible; (2) criminal street
gang enhancement statute is neither overbroad nor vague; and (3) evidence was
sufficient to support finding that crime was
committed in association with criminal
street gang.
Affirmed.
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
976(b), parts IV, V, VI, VII and Vm are not

3. Criminal Law <£»486(4)
Officers established sufficient foundation for their expert opinions regarding
criminal street gang context in which attempted murder defendant acted; officers'
opinions were based on personal observations of and discussions with gang members, as well as information from other
officers and department's files. West's
Ann.Cal.Evid.Code § 801.
4. Criminal Law $=»486(4)
Officers' expert opinions regarding attempted murder defendant's street gang
affiliation were admissible, though officers
based opinions in part upon information
received from unidentified gang members;
gang members' statements were not offered for truth of matters asserted therein,
and officers' opinions were also based upon
personal observation and experience, observations of other officers, police reports,
and physical evidence indicative of defendant's gang affiliation. West's Ann.Cal.
Evid.Code §§ 801(b), 802.
5. Criminal Law <s-l206.1(1)
Sentence enhancement provision for
participation in "criminal street gang" was
not unconstitutionally overbroad; statute
regulated criminal conduct, not speech or
published.
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association, and there was no right of association to engage in criminal conduct
U.S.CA. ConstAmends. 1, 5, 14; West's
Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 186.22.
6. Criminal Law *=»1206.1(1)
Sentence enhancement provision for
"active participation" in criminal street
gang was not unconstitutionally vague; to
be convicted, defendant must have more
than nominal, passive, inactive or purely
technical relationship with gang, and person must devote all, or substantial part of
his time and efforts to criminal street
gang. U.S.CA. ConstAmends. 1, 14;
West's Ann.CaLPenal Code § 186.22.
7. Criminal Law <S=>1206.1(1)
Sentence enhancement for "membership" in criminal street gang was not unconstitutionally vague. U.S.CA. Const
Amends. 1, 14; West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code
§ 186.22.
& Criminal Law <8=>1206.1(1)
Sentence enhancement provision for
participation in "criminal street gang" was
not unconstitutionally vague; statutory
definition clarified that it was not mere
association with others, but rather association with others for purpose of committing
crime, where association's very existence
was founded upon commission of crime,
that was prohibited. U.S.CA. Const
Amends. 1, 14; West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code
§ 186.22.
9. Constitutional Law <S=»27(K2)
Criminal Law ^1206.1(1)
Sentence enhancement provision for
crimes committed in association with criminal street gang, with specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct
of members of gang, did not violate due
process, even though it did not require
proof that defendant was aware of predicate offenses committed by other gang
members. U.S.CA. ConstAmends. 5, 14;
West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 186.22.
10. Criminal Law **1208.6(5)
Enhancement of attempted murder defendant's sentence on ground that crime
was committed in association with criminal

evidence that predicate offenses committed
by other gang members were gang related
and that intended victim of instant offense
was member of rival gang who had recently been involved in shooting of member of
defendant's gang. West's Ann.Cal.Penal
Code § 186.22(b).
I Stephen Gilbert, Santa Monica, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
defendant and appellant
Ronald Y. Butler, Public Defender, Carl
C Holmes, Chief Deputy Public Defender,
and Thomas Havlena, Deputy Public Defender, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George
Williamson, Chief Asst Atty. Gen., Harley
D. Mayfield, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Keith M.
Motley, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen.,
and Karl Terp, Deputy Atty. Gen., for
plaintiff and respondent
OPINION
MOORE, Associate Justice.
Ralph Gamez (defendant) was convicted
in a jury trial of attempted murder (count
I) and assault with a firearm against the
same victim (count II); assault with a firearm against three additional victims
(counts III, IV, V); discharging a firearm
from a vehicle (count VI); and discharging
a firearm at an unoccupied vehicle (count
VII). Enhancements for great bodily injury and great bodily injury in discharging a
firearm from a vehicle during the attempted murder and assault with a firearm
charges in counts I and II and for personal
use of a firearm in the attempted murder
and the four assault with afirearmcharges
(counts I through V) were found true. Finally, defendant was found to have committed all of the crimes in association with a
criminal street gang.
In the published portion of the opinion,
we consider the following issues raised by
defendant: (1) The admission of opinion
evidence regarding gangs was in contravention of the Evidence Code and the confrontation clause; and (2) there was insuffi-
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cient evidence that defendant committed
the crimes in association with a criminal
street gang, as required by section 186.22,
subdivision (b).
Amici Curiae further allege the criminal
street gang enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b) is
unconstitutional because it (1) is fatally
overbroad and vague and punishes the
right to free association in violation of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and (2) violates due process of
law.
FACTS
l963Teenagers Yvette Costa and her sister
Rachel lived with their family in Santa
Ana. On August 31, 1989, two teenage
boys, Frankie Castellanos and Rachel's
boyfriend, Guillermo Briseno, came over
for dinner. Guillermo, a member of the
"Highland Street" gang who went by the
moniker of "Rambo," parked his car in
front of the house. Police believed Guillermo had been involved in a recent shooting
directed against a rival gang with whom
Highland had previously been affiliated,
"Southside F-Troop" (Southside).
Later that evening, the Costa sisters and
two of Yvette's friends, Lorena and Norma
Quintana, were standing outside the residence looking at photographs. At about 9
p.m., a black Nissan truck came around the
corner with its lights out, followed by a
Buick Regal. As the truck drove slowly
by, an individual in the passenger seat of
the truck pointed a gun out the window
and fired five to ten shots.
Yvette screamed that the people in the
truck were from "South," meaning Southside. The gun had a long black barrel, and
the assailant was approximately 14 feet
away from the girls when he opened fire.
Lorena was shot in the back but survived.
The other girls were not hurt
Tereso Rangel, who lived next door to
the Costas, had parked his car on the street
earlier that afternoon. He heard the shots,
but was unable to inspect his car for damage because police were investigating the
shooting. He was told his car had been
damaged. The next morning, he noticed
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the back window was broken out and his
car had bullet holes in it
Yvette Costa identified defendant as the
shooter to investigating officers and at trial. She knew him by his gang nickname of
"Hydro." Norma Quintana picked defendant out of a photographic lineup.
Defendant's residence in Anaheim was
searched pursuant to warrant approximately 12 days after the shooting. A black
Nissan truck was parked in the driveway.
A box of bullets, paper, books, a plaque, tshirt, and a traffic ticket were seized. The
plaque was addressed to defendant's brother Jerry, a known Southside gang member,
and had a reference to the Southside gang
on it The t-shirt had "Southside" printed
on it The traffic ticket was issued to
defendant while he had been driving the
truck. The books and papers were from
defendant's school and had writing on them
referring to the Southside gang and "Hydro."
Three Santa Ana police officers testified
as experts regarding their knowledge of
gangs in general and the Southside and
Highland Street gangs in ^particular.
Southside and Highland Street had former
ly been factions within the F-Troop gang,
but had since split and were now rivals.
One of the officers opined the shooting was
a "pay-back" for a prior shooting by Highland Street against Southside. Another
opined defendant was a member of Southside. Photographs taken in October 1987,
showing defendant with other known
Southside gang members "throwing'' the
gang's hand signs, were introduced to corroborate the officers' opinions. Based on
his own personal knowledge, crime and victim reports, conversations with other officers and statements by gang members, one
officer gave his opinion that Southside was
a criminal street gang engaged in a pattern
of criminal activity.
DEFENSE
Various family members testified defendant was at home watching television the
entire evening of August 31, 1989. The
truck was owned by his brother but was
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usually driven by his father, who had driven it on August 31 and returned home
before 9 p.m.
DISCUSSION
I
EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY
Defendant does not object to the officers'
testimony concerning criminal street gangs
in general, involving subjects such as territory, retaliation, graffiti, hand signals, and
dress. He does object to the officers being
allowed to testify that various individuals,
including defendant, were members of either the Southside or Highland gangs, that
the shooting was in retaliation for a prior
crime perpetrated on the Southside gang
by Highland Street involving Guillermo
Briseno, and various prior crimes were
perpetrated by Southside rendering them a
criminal street gang within the meaning of
section 186.22. Defendant does not cite
any particular testimony; rather he attacks
the "opinions as to the reasons for appellant's actions and the actions of others, and
about appellant's culpability under Penal
Code section 186.22."l His two primary
contentions are that (1) the officers' opinions were not of the type which would
assist the trier of fact and (2) the information used by the officers in forming their
opinions was of a sort that cannot be reasonably relied upon by an expert
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the hearing, whether or not admissible,
that is of a type that reasonably may be
relied upon by an expert in forming an
opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded
by law from using such matter as a basis
for his opinion." Defendant relies upon
People v. Hernandez (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d
271, 138 Cal.Rptr. 675 as support for the
rather unsjtecific notion that the officers'
testimony went "too far
" In Hernandez, the court found an abuse of discretion
in admitting a police officer's opinion that
defendant's shaking his head from side to
side meant he had been asked if he had any
more narcotics and had responded that he
did not (JcL at pp. 274-275, 138 Cal.Rptr.
675.) The court held the officer's expertise
did not add any probative value to the
evidence, which the jury was quite capable
of analyzing for itself. (Id at p. 281, 138
Cal.Rptr. 675.)

[1] Here, the situation was very different The relationship between Southside
and Highland Street, defendant's membership in Southside, the Highland Street
membership of some of the guests at the
Costa residence on the night of the shooting, and the ongoing criminality of Southside were all matters beyond common
knowledge. "[T]he decisive consideration
in determining the admissibility of expert
opinion evidence is whether the subject of
inquiry is one of such common knowledge
that men of ordinary education could reach
a conclusion as intelligently as the witness
1965^4. The Officers' Opinions Were of or whether, on the other hand, the matter
Assistance to the Trier of Fact
is sufficiently beyond common experience
Evidence Code section 801 sets forth the that the opinion of an expert would assist
grounds for the admission of expert opin- the trier of fact [Citations.]" (People v.
ion testimony. It states, "If a witness is Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99,103, 301 P.2d 854.)
testifying as an expert, his testimony in the
[2] Section 186.22 requires evidence of
form of an opinion is limited to such an a gang's past criminal conduct and ongoing
opinion as is: [11] (a) Related to a subject criminal nature. This may often require
that is sufficiently beyond common experi- some expert testimony regarding the activience that the opinion of an expert would ties of the gang. To the extent such testiassist the trier of fact; and [11] (b) Based on mony necessarily paralleled elements of the
matter (including his special knowledge, criminal street gang allegation, Evidence
skill, experience, training, and education) Code section 805 provides, "Testimony in
perceived by or personally known to the the form of opinion that is otherwise admiswitness or made known to him at or before sible is not objectionable because it em1. All statutory references are to the Penal Code

unless otherwise specified.
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braces the ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact" So long as expert testimony assists the trier of fact, it is proper
even though it provides evidence of the
elements of the allegations charged.
l96eln addition, case law has upheld expert police officer testimony in the field of
gang sociology and psychology. In re
Darrell T. (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 325, 153
Cal.Rptr. 261 is illustrative. There, a high
school security guard testified in a murder
prosecution that two campus gangs had
been rivals for two years prior to the murder. One of the gangs, the "Shotgun
Crips," fought with the "Fives" gang the
day before the killing. The security guard
testified that "[t]he various Crip factions
would squabble among themselves, but
would not unite with a non-Crip gang such
as the Fives to form an alliance. Thus,
while each of the separate Crip factions
was, in effect, autonomous, the various
Crip units involved ... were by their very
nature 'anti-Fives/" (Id at pp. 328-329,
153 Cal.Rptr. 261, fn. omitted.)
[3] In People v. McDaniels (1980) 107
Cal.App.3d 898, 166 Cal.Rptr. 12, the court
upheld testimony from a Los Angeles
County sheriffs deputy regarding the "social customs, methods of operation of
gangs in south central Los Angeles
"
The court referred to the testimony as "sociological evidence," and upheld its admission over a claim the officer lacked that
expertise. (Id. at pp. 904-905, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 12.) People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51
Cal.3d 1179, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d
1159 is also illustrative, but as an example
where such testimony was not admitted.
In Gonzalez, a police officer and gang expert properly testified on rebuttal concerning gang activities and methods in a certain
geographical area, but also testified that
"from his training, experience, and information," a defense witness was not an active member of a certain gang. (Id at p.
1237, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159.)
This latter portion of his testimony was
stricken by the trial court because, on voir
dire, the officer "conceded his opinion was
based only on the fact that [the witness's]
name was unknown to sheriffs investiga-
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tors and did not appear in the department's
files." (Ibid) In contrast, the officers in
the case before us were able to establish a
much stronger foundation for their testimony by including personal observations of
and discussions with gang members as well
as information from other officers and the
department's files. The foundation for the
officers' expert opinions was diverse and
strong, and the opinions were properly admitted.
B. The Officers' Expert Opinions Did
Not Rely On Impermissible Matter
Defendant contends the officers' opinions
"were no more than a vehicle for the introduction into evidence of hearsay to prove
facts that could not lawfully be proven by
the prosecution." He argues the officers
relied upon information received from unidentified and unreliable parties in violation
of the Evidence Code and the confrontation
clause.
Defendant relies upon Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d
112, 211 CaLRptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653. In
Isaacs, 1967QUT Supreme Court indicated
that, on retrial, the trial court should exclude testimony by an expert witness regarding crime statistics of the City of Pasadena gleaned from an unidentified "contact
at a police department
" (Id at p. 133,
211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653.) The court
indicated that if the information had been
received from a more reliable source, such
as a California Department of Justice report, it would have been admissible. However, obtaining such information from "an
unidentified contact in an unidentified police department scarcely constitutes the
sort of material that may be reasonably
relied upon by an expert in forming his
opinion. [Citation.]" (Id at pp. 133-134,
211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653.)
Evidence Code section 801, subdivision
(b) permits an expert to rely upon otherwise inadmissible evidence in forming an
opinion if it is "of a type that reasonably
may be relied upon by an expert in forming
an opinion upon the subject to which his
testimony relates
" (See also 2 Jefferson, Cal.Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982)
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§ 29.4, pp. 1026-1027.) Evidence Code section 802 provides, "A witness testifying in
the form of an opinion may state on direct
examination the reasons for his opinion and
the matter . . . upon which it is based,
unless he is precluded by law from using
such reasons or matter as a basis for his
opinion
"
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with young people on the streets/ In addition, [he] stated that 'as part of [his] duties
[he had] made an effort to study the social
customs, methods of operation of gangs in
south central Losj^sAngeles.'" {Id at p.
904,166 Cal.Rptr. 12.) The court dismissed
defendant's contention that the officer's
opinion was based on improper hearsay and
violated Evidence Code section 801, stating,
"Defendant has made no showing that the
matter relied on here was other than of 'a
type that reasonably may be relied upon by
an expert.' Indeed, as the Law Revision
Commission comment to section 801 notes,
*[t]he variation in the permissible bases of
expert opinion is unavoidable in light of the
wide variety of subjects upon which such
opinion can be offered. In regard to some
matter of expert opinion, an expert must,
if he is going to give an opinion that will be
helpful to the jury, rely on reports, statements, and other information that might
not be admissible evidence.' Such was necessarily the case, we think, with regard to
the type of sociological evidence presented
in this instance." (Id. at p. 905, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 12.) *

[4] Here, the officers opinions were
based upon personal observations and experience, the observations of other officers
in the department, police reports, and conversations with other gang members. The
officers also had a photo of defendant
"throwing" gang signs with other gang
members in October 1987, and access to the
writings on defendant's textbooks and papers which displayed his gang affiliation.
They knew defendant had been a Southside
gang member in the past and had "hung
out" with its members. In addition, Guillermo Briseno had been implicated as the
shooter in a prior incident where the victim
was a Southside member.
The statements of gang members were
only a portion of the foundation for the
officers1 opinions. The situation here is
thus not analogous to that in Isaacs v.
Huntington Memorial Hospital, supra, 38
Cal.3d 112, 211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653
where the entirety of the expert's opinion
was based upon one source who was unidentified. And, in People v. McDaniels,
supra, 107 Cal.App.3d 898, 166 Cal.Rptr.
12, the court, in upholding sociological testimony by a deputy sheriff, stated, "The
officer established his credentials as follows: six and one-half years assignment to
the sheriffs street gang detail in south
central Los Angeles; he was told to ascertain 'the number of and find out as much
as best [he could] the names of people who
belonged to the various gangs in that particular station's area' by gathering information from 'crime reports, interviews . . .
of people in custody, and conversations

We fail to see how the officers could
proffer an opinion about gangs, and in particular about gangs in the area, without
reference to conversations with gang members. While the credibility of those sources
may not be beyond reproach, nevertheless,
as the court in McDaniels and the Law
Revision Commission comments to Evidence Code section 801 note, "[t]he variation in the permissible bases of expert opinion is unavoidable in light of a wide variety
of subjects upon which such opinion can be
offered." (Ibid.) To know about the
gangs involved, the officers had to speak
with members and their rivals. Furthermore, the officers did not simply regurgitate that which they had been told. Rather, they combined what they had been told
with other information, including their ob-

2. In contrast, in In re Wing Y. (1977) 67 Cal.
App.3d 69, 136 Cal.Rptr. 390, the court held that
a police officer's testimony that various witnesses had reputations as being gang members was
inadmissible hearsay. {Id at pp. 74-75, 77-78,
136 Cal.Rptr. 390.) However, the officer was

therefore his testimony was governed by the
more restrictive rule under Evidence Code section 702 regulating the testimony of a lay witness, requiring that he have personal knowledge
concerning the subject matter of his testimony.
{Id. at pp. 77-78, 136 Cal.Rptr. 390.)
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servations, in establishing a foundation for
their opinions. The statements of gang
members, which in part formed the bases
of the officers' opinions, were not recited in
detail during the officers' testimony but
were referenced in a more general fashion,
along with other, corroborating information.3 "While an expert may state lseson
direct examination the matters on which he
relied in forming his opinion, he may not
testify as to the details of such matters if
they are otherwise inadmissible. [Citations.] The rule rests on the rationale that
while an expert may give reasons on direct
examination for his opinions, including the
matters he considered in forming them, he
may not under the guise of reasons bring
before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence. [Citation.]" (People v. Coleman
(1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 92, 211 Cal.Rptr. 102,
695 P.2d 189; quoting Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 788789, 174 CaLRptr. 348.)
While we are sensitive to defendant's
concern that a conviction not be based on
hearsay testimony, that is not what occurred here. The officers did not simply
recite what they had been told, but instead
provided foundational testimony for their
opinions which was sufficiently corroborated by other competent evidence, both
physical and testimonial. Accordingly, we
do not find that their testimony violated the
confrontation clause, as the statements
were not themselves offered for the truth
of the matters asserted, but instead were
generally related as one of the bases for
the officers' expert opinions. (See United
States v. Lujan (9th Cir.1991) 936 F.2d 406,
410, citing United States v. Kirk (9th Cir.
1988) 844 F.2d 660, 663.) Nor do we find
S. Thus, for example, the officers properly gave
their opinion of the motive for the shooting, as
motive was relevant to establish that the crime
was perpetrated to promote, further, or assist
the gang. In opining that the shooting was in
retaliation for an earlier shooting by Highland
Street against Southside, the officers explained
that the two gangs did not get along and were
rivals. This, in turn, was based upon various
statements by gang members, prior incidents
involving the gangs, and other information gathered and observations made by the officers. In
relating the earlier shooting by Highland Street
against Southside, the officers noted that the
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the officers based their opinions upon impermissible hearsay in violation of the Evidence Code.
II
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF SECTION 186.22
Amici argue that section 186.22 is unconstitutional. First, amici claim the term
"criminal street gang" is vague and overbroad, thus violating appellant's First
Amendment right of freedom of association. Secondly, amici argue, as does appellant's counsel,4 that the statute violates
due process unless appellant is shown to
have knowledge of the predicate offenses
committed by the gang. We shall treat
these two contentions separately.
A.

Vagueness and Overbreadth: Freedom of Association
Subdivision (a) of section 186.22 provides,
"Any person who actively participates in
any criminal street gang with knowledge
that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or
assists in any felonious criminal conduct by
members of that gang, shall be punished
by...." Subdivision (bXl) j^oprovides,
"Except as provided in paragraph (2), any
person who is convicted of a felony which
is committed for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with any
criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members, shall,
upon conviction of that felony, in addition
and consecutive to the punishment preshooting, and a witness yelled "There's Rambo,"
and "It's Highland Street." Other testimony established that Guillermo Briseno, present at the
Costa house on the night of the shooting, was
known as "Rambo" and had been a member of
Highland Street. Also, the gun used in the
shooting was seized from the home of two selfadmitted members of Highland Street.
4. Though appellant's counsel raised this issue in
the context of the sufficiency of the evidence,
judicial economy dictates it be discussed in this
portion of the opinion.
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scribed for the felony or attempted felony
of which he or she has been convicted, be
punished by
"
Subdivision (e) provides, "As used in this
chapter, 'pattern of criminal gang activity*
means the commission, attempted commission, or solicitation of two or more of the
following offenses, provided at least one of
those offenses occurred after the effective
date of this chapter and the last of those
offenses occurred within three years after
a prior offense, and the offenses are committed on separate occasions, or by two or
more persons: . . . " The subsection then
goes on to list eight categories of predicate
offenses.
Subdivision (f) provides, "As used in this
chapter, 'criminal street gang' means any
ongoing organization, association, or group
of three or more persons, whether formal
or informal, having as one of its primary
activities the commission of one or more of
the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs
(1) to (8), inclusive, of subdivision (e), which
has a common name or common identifying
sign or symbol, whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity."
15] Defendant first claims the definition
of "criminal street gang" found in subdivision (f) is too broad to survive constitutional scrutiny. He argues section 186.22 punishes membership in groups as diverse as
the Los Angeles Police Department, Humboldt County environmental activists, or,
for that matter, any group whose individual members may commit criminal offenses. Defendant claims the fact that the
statute could apply to such diverse groups
renders it overbroad and void for vagueness. He attempts to distinguish People v.
Green (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 140, which held section 186.22 is not
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, on
the grounds Green did not address the
outer boundaries of the statute's application, or First Amendment freedom of association issues.
"[TJhe mere fact that one can conceive of
some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible

to an overbreadth challenge." (City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466
U.S. 789, 800, 104 S.Ct 2118, 2126, 80
L.Ed.2d 772.) Defendant's analogy to the
Los Angeles Police Department is thus inapposite. Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (f) defines "criminal street gang" as
an ongoing organization having "as one of
its primary activities" the commission of
one of the enumerated offenses. Though
members of the Los Angeles Police Department may commit an ^enumerated offense while on duty, the commission of
crime is not a primary activity of the
department. Penal Code section 186.22
does not punish association with a group of
individuals who, in a separate capacity,
may commit crimes. Rather, it requires
that one of the primary activities of the
group or association itself be the commission of crime. The section regulates conduct, not speech or association, and there is
no right of association to engage in criminal conduct Similarly, environmental activists or any other group engaged in civil
disobedience could not be considered a
criminal street gang under the statutory
definition unless one of the primary activities of the group was the commission of
one of the eight enumerated crimes found
within the statute. On the other hand, one
is free to associate with whomever one
wishes under the statute, so long as the
primary purpose of associating one's self
with the group is not to commit crime. It
is not the association with other individuals
alone which section 186.22 addresses, but
the association with others for the purpose
of promoting, furthering or assisting
them in the commission of crime.
In order for a statute which regulates
conduct to be considered overbroad, "the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." (Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973)
413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918, 37
L.Ed.2d 830.) A finding of overbreadth
entails a statute that achieves its goal "by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." (NAACP v. Alabama (1964)

902

286 CALIFORNIA REPORTER

377 U.S. 288, 307, 84 S.Ct 1302, 1314, 12
L.Ed.2d 325.) This statute does not invade
the area of protected freedoms. It does
not seek to regulate speech but conduct,
and regulates only conduct which is criminal. The right of association is affected
only to the extent the purpose of association is the perpetuation of criminal activity.
Since section 186.22 seeks only to regulate
association which is directed towards the
perpetuation of criminal activity, its sweep
is not overbroad.
[6,7] In regard to vagueness, "a statute must be sufficiently definite to provide
adequate notice of the conduct proscribed
[11] [It] must provide sufficiently definite guidelines for the police in
order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." (People v. Superior
Court (Caswell) (1988) 46 Cal.3d 381, 389390, 250 Cal.Rptr. 515, 758 P.2d 1046.)
However, "[Reasonable certainty is all
that is required. A statute will not be held
void for vagueness if any reasonable and
practical construction can be given its language or if its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to other definable
sources. [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of
Walton (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 108, 116, 104
Cal.Rptr. 472.) " ' . . . [T]he constitution
does not require impossible standards'; all
that is required is that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when ^measured by
common understanding and practices
'
[Citation omitted.]" (Roth v. United
States (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct
1304, 1312, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498.)
This statute purports to regulate conduct
involving membership in an organization
which has as one of its primary activities,
and therefore purposes, the commission of
crime. Moreover, it is not merely the passive association with such a group which is
criminalized, but the active participation in
the group which renders one susceptible to
prosecution. The statute requires that an
individual either wilfully [subsection (a) ] or
with specific intent [subsection (bXl) ] "promote, further, or assist in any [felonious]
criminal conduct" by members of that
gang. Quoting from our colleagues in Pea-

235 CaLAppJd 971
pie v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 692,
278 Cal.Rptr. 140: "Section 186.22 does not
make 'membership' criminal; rather, under
specified circumstances it makes 'active
participation' criminal.
By using the
phrase 'actively participates,' the California
Legislature evidently sought to prevent
prosecution of persons who were no more
than nominal or inactive members of a
criminal street gang. The phrase, in context, has the same meaning as 'active membership' as defined by the case law. To be
convicted of being an active participant in a
street gang, a defendant must have a relationship with a criminal street gang which
is (1) more than nominal, passive, inactive
or purely technical and (2) the person must
devote all, or a substantial part of his time
and efforts to the criminal street gang. So
construed, we see little likelihood that the
phrase will permit arbitrary law enforcement or provide inadequate notice to potential offenders. [11] Neither do we see any
difficulty with the term 'membership,' a
term which, as discussed, has an ordinary
meaning and which has been defined further in the cases. It is true that the term
is not susceptible of precise definition, but
absolute definition is not required. The
argument that 'membership' is overbroad
as potentially including persons who have
been intimidated into membership is irrelevant Section 186.22 does not prohibit
membership; it prohibits the promotion,
furtherance or assistance in any felonious
criminal conduct by members. That a
member may not be a whole-hearted participant in the felonious criminal conduct
should have no bearing on the criminal
liability of the person who promotes, furthers or assists such conduct." (Ibid, at p.
700, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.)
[8] In addition, while the word "gang"
may be vague, the term "criminal street
gang" is not. As Green points out, "[S]ection 186.22, subdivision (a) does not make it
criminal to be a member of an undefined
'gang'; it prohibits membership in a 'criminal street gang,' . . . " (IcL at p. 701, 278
Cal.Rptr. 140.) The definition of a criminal
street gang as "any ongoing organization,
association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having
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as one of its primary activities the commis- out such strict construction, he argues, he
sion of one or more of the criminal acts would be punished for pure "association"
enumerated," specifically apprises an indi- activity without any knowledge of facts
vidual that it is not i^mere association causing his association with the group to
with others, but association with others for fall within the parameters of the statute.
the purpose of committing crime, where In Lanzetta v. New Jersey (1939) 306 U.S.
the association's very existence is founded 451, 59 S.Ct 618, 83 L.Ed. 888, the United
upon the commission of crime, that is pro- States Supreme Court held that due prohibited. This is not vague. (See § 186.22, cess requires that "[a]ll ... be informed as
subd. (f); People v. Green, supra, at pp. to what the State commands or forbids.
701-702, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.)
[Fn. omitted.]" (Id at p. 453, 59 S.Ct at
Defendant analogizes to In re Timothy 619.) Defendant also argues that, since
R. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 593, 248 Cal.Rptr. subdivision (a) requires actual knowledge
721, where the court struck down a local that other members of the group have enordinance which purported to prohibit "the gaged in a pattern of criminal activity, the
of
presence on properly posted business or same must be true for an imposition
5
sentence
under
subdivision
(b).
commercial premises or other private property of anyone who does not have written
permission from the owner, lessee or other
person in charge. [Fn. omitted.]" (Id. at
pp. 595-596, 248 Cal.Rptr. 721.) Yet there,
the court noted the problem with the statute was that it was susceptible to subjective police enforcement and interpretation.
(Id. at pp. 600-601, 248 Cal.Rptr. 721.)
Such a potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement goes to the very heart
of vagueness. (People v. Superior Court
(Caswell), supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 389-390,
250 CaLRptr. 515, 758 P.2d 1046.)

Defendant urges that, if this court does
not hold section 186.22 to be unconstitutional per se, the court should strictly construe it to avoid punishing "association activity." Defendant argues such strict construction requires the prosecution to prove
he was aware of the predicate offenses
committed by other gang members. With-

Subdivision (a) of section 186.22, which
was not charged, punishes an active member of a criminal street gang who wilfully
promotes, furthers, or assists in the felonious conduct of the gang "with knowledge
that its iwjmembers engage in or have
engaged in pattern of criminal gang activity
" (Italics added.) It is not an
enhancement, but a substantive offense,
and punishes one who, with knowledge of
the criminal nature of the gang, willfully
promotes or assists it in its pursuit of
crime. Subdivision (b) is an enhancement,
and creates additional punishment for anyone who commits a felony for the benefit
of, at the direction of, or in association with
a street gang, as that term is defined, and
with the specific intent to promote, further,
or assist in the criminal conduct of members of the gang. The two subdivisions are
also distinct because they punish completely separate conduct The gravamen of subdivision (a) is the participation in the gang
itself. This "active" participation must require knowledge of the gang's primary activities; this is axiomatic and included in
the statutory language. Subdivision (b),
however, is narrower. It is directed at a
particular crime. It punishes an individual
who has committed a crime for the benefit
of a gang and with the specific intent to
promote, further, or assist in any criminal
conduct by members of the gang. It does

5. Subdivision (a) of section 186.22 requires that
knowledge of the pattern of gang activity be

proved. This requirement is absent from the
language of subdivision (b).

Here, the danger of such selective or
arbitrary enforcement is not present The
standards enunciated in section 186.22 are
capable of being "objectively ascertained
by reference to common experiences of
mankind." (See People v. Daniels (1969)
71 Cal.2d 1119, 1129, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459
P.2d 225.)
B. Section 186.22 Does Not Violate
Due Process
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not require knowledge of the predicate offenses as a prerequisite to its imposition.
"[S]tatutes must be construed in a reasonable and common sense manner
"
(Herbert Hawkins Realtors, Inc. v. Milheiser (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 334, 338, 189
Cal.Rptr. 450.) Nothing in the statute indicates that knowledge of the specific predicate offenses need be shown. The fact
that subdivision (a) refers to and requires
knowledge of a pattern of criminal gang
activity is evidence that the failure to refer
to knowledge in subdivision (b) was not a
negligent omission by the legislature and
that knowledge is not required to be proven.* "[A]bsent a constitutional basis for
departure from a clear expression of legislative intent, we are bound thereby."
(Steed v. Imperial Airlines (1974) 12
Cal.3d 115,120,115 Cal.Rptr. 329, 524 P.2d
801.)
j^sHowever, defendant seeks to require
the prosecution to prove in subdivision (b)
not only defendant's commission of a crime
with the stated purpose and intent, but also
his actual knowledge of the specific predicate offenses committed. He urges us to
adopt a knowledge requirement even
though the statute is not so written, arguing that, if the statute is to pass constitutional muster, knowledge of the predicate
offenses must be required. He further
maintains that our failure to require that
knowledge of the predicate offenses be
proved would be tantamount to condoning
the state's interference in an individual's
constitutional right of association.
6. The court in People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.
App.3d 692, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140 stated that "Criminal liability under section 186.22 requires that a
defendant have knowledge that the criminal
street gang's members engage in a pattern of
criminal conduct" (Id. at p. 702, 278 Cal.Rptr.
140.) However, this language is taken directly
from subdivision (a) of that section; it is not
found anywhere in subdivision (b). This is indicative of a problem which permeates the
Green decision; the court continually refers to
section 186.22 when its primary focus is on
subdivision (a) of that section. As we have
pointed out, subdivision (b) is quite distinct
from subdivision (a). Subdivision (a), a substantive offense, requires active participation in
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In People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.
App.3d 692, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140, the court
analogized to the federal RICO statute,
which criminalizes an individual's association with an enterprise which is involved in
a "pattern of racketeering activity."
"Plaintiff must show 'evidence [that defendant is part] of an ongoing organization,
formal or informal, and ... evidence that
the various associates [of the organization]
function as a continuing unit*" (Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp. (5th Cir.
1987) 818 F.2d 423, 426, quoting Atkinson
v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co. (5th Cir.
1987) 808 F.2d 438, 440; see also United
States v. Turkette (1981) 452 U.S. 576, 583,
101 S.Ct 2524, 2528, 69 LEd.2d 246.) The
government must show the organization is
involved in racketeering activity, which is
defined as the commission of various predicate offenses within a certain time period,
and defendant's association with the organization is for the purpose of promoting
such racketeering activity. However,
knowledge of the predicate offenses themselves is not required. Even so, the RICO
statute has survived numerous constitutional challenges. (See, e.g., United States
v. Tripp (6th Cir.1986) 782 F.2d 38, 42.)
[9] Nor do we see any reason to require
knowledge of the specific, charged predicate offenses here. A gang becomes a
criminal street gang when one of its primary activities is the commission of various
crimes. An individual who commits an offense for the benefit of or in association
gage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal
gang activity—" Subdivision (b), an enhancement, contains no similar language. In the absence of language to the contrary, we cannot
impose an additional requirement to subdivision (b) which the Legislature obviously did not
intend to require. (See People v. Vaughn (1961)
196 Cal.App.2d 622, 629, 16 Cal.Rptr. 711.) Nor
is this opinion in disagreement with People v.
Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 278 Cal.Rptr.
140, as that opinion upheld a conviction for
section 186.22, subdivision (a), and was not
called upon, as are we, to rule upon the validity
of subdivision (b). "[C]ases ... are not authority for propositions not there considered." (People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal3d 470, 481. 116
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with the gang and with the specific intent
to promote, further or assist members of
the gang becomes liable for an additional
sentence enhancement Due process concerns would only be raised if the enhancement did not provide, "(1) a standard of
conduct for those whose activities are proscribed and (2) a standard for police enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt"
(Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d
257, 269, 198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732.)
"[E]ven where persons of ordinary intelligence . . . differ with respect to the meaning of a statutory term ... [s]uch differences do not necessarily make the statutes
void." (People v. Sassounian (1986) 182
Cal.App.3d 361, 412, 226 Cal.Rptr. 880.)
All that is required is that ordinary people
can understand what kind of conduct is
prohibited with a reasonable degree of certainty, by reference, if need be, to other
definablejjpesources. (County of Nevada
v. MacMillen (1974) 11 Cal.3d 662, 673,114
Cal.Rptr. 345, 522 P.2d 1345. See also
People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247,
266, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861.)
Such a reasonable degree of certainty is
attained. There is nothing in the phrase
"promote, further or assist" which cannot
be comprehended with a reasonable degree
of certainty. Ordinary people should not
have any trouble discerning that the statute penalizes those whose felonious conduct is undertaken with the intent to promote, further or assist a criminal street
gang. Nor is the definition of criminal
street gang beyond reasonable ascertainment The requisite elements of such an
organization are clearly set forth in subdivision (f), and the predicate offenses which
constitute a "pattern of criminal gang activity" are listed in subdivision (e).
In failing to compel knowledge of the
predicate offenses themselves, the Legislature did not offend notions of due process.
The requirement that defendant commit
the crime for the benefit of or in the association with the gang and with the specific
intent to promote, further, or assist members of the gang in any criminal conduct is
sufficient to appease any concerns regarding a violation of due process based upon

us to require knowledge of the predicate
offenses, as the conduct proscribed by the
statute is ascertainable to a reasonable degree of certainty and involves felonious
conduct undertaken with a specific, criminal intent In short, an individual who
violates subdivision (b) does so at the peril
that the history of his gang will reveal the
predicate offenses.
Ill
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCESECTION 186.22, SUBDIVISION
(b)
[10] Defendant contends the evidence
adduced at trial was insufficient to show
his conduct fell within the purview of section 186.22, subdivision (b). It requires defendant's conduct to be "committed for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the
specific intent to promote, further, or assist
in any criminal conduct by gang members
" Defendant argues the evidence
was insufficient to show the existence of a
street gang, that the offense was committed for the benefit of or in association with
a street gang, and that it was committed
with the specific intent to promote, further,
or assist a street gang. We disagree.
A

Sufficient Evidence Existed That
Southside Was a Criminal Street
Gang
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence Southside was a criminal
street gang. He contends the proffered
evidence of predicate offenses lyndid not
establish that those offenses, though they
may have been committed by Southside
gang members, were in any way related to
the gang or to defendant's association with
the gang. However, the evidence belies his
contention.
An appellate court cannot reverse a conviction on a claim of insufficient evidence
unless it clearly appears "that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it. [Citation.]"
(People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745,
755. 79 CaLRotr. 529. 457 P.2d 321.) We
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must review the whole record in the light
most favorable to the judgment and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v.
Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 117, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 391, 641 P.2d 1253; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576, 162 Cal.Rptr.
431, 606 P.2d 738.) The critical question is,
"'whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.'" (Ibid., quoting
Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307,
318-319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 278&-2789, 61
L.Ed.2d 560.)
We need not repeat the evidence that
established Southside as an entity; that
evidence was abundant The officers who
testified believed Southside had been engaged in a rivalry or "war" with Highland
Street for at least a year. Certified court
documents were introduced to establish
five individuals affiliated with Southside
had been convicted of various of the eight
enumerated offenses found in section 186.22, subdivision (e). Expert testimony established these affiliations.7
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gang has "as one of its primary activities"
the commission of one or more of the eight
enumerated offenses. To allow otherwise
would be to punish defendant for 1978the
unrelated actions of people with whom he
associated. Yet this was not the case.
One of the five convictions involved the
killing of two individuals on a bicycle shot
in a rival gang's territory. There, a Southside member was searching for rival gang
members to shoot in retaliation for a crime
committed against Southside. In another
conviction, a Southside gang member killed
the father of a rival gang member after
firing at and missing the gang member.8
This evidence, when coupled with expert
testimony about how gangs such as Southside are motivated and how offenses perpetrated against the gang are met with retaliation, was more than sufficient to establish
that, at least with respect to these two
predicate offenses, they were gang related.
This is all the statute requires.
B. Sufficient Evidence Was Adduced
that Defendant Committed the Instant Offense For the Benefit of the
Gang and With the Specific Intent
to Promote or Assist the Gang

Defendant argues even if the predicate
crimes were shown, there was no proof
they were related in any way to the gang
itself. We agree with defendant it must be
shown the predicate crimes were gang related, as section 186.22, subdivision (f) requires the prosecution to prove that the

Defendant contends there was no proof
the shooting was done with the intent to
promote, further or assist criminal conduct
by Southside. This is also belied by the
evidence. Defendant drove to a location in
Highland Street territory. Expert testimony established that Hispanic gangs are ex-

7. The testimony established that the predicate
crimes were committed by Southside and that
Southside was a criminal street gang within the
meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (f).
Southside had a name and identified itself in a
common manner on graffiti; it had its own
hand signs and had as one of its primary activities the commission of various of the statutorilyenumerated crimes. The proof was quantitatively and qualitatively distinct from that found
insufficient in In re Lincoln J. (1990) 223 Cal.
App.3d 322, 327-330, 272 Cal.Rptr. 852. Much
of the testimony specifically related to Southside and was offered by experts who were familiar with Southside and who had worked or did
work in Southside territory. (Compare In re
Nathaniel C (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 10041005, 279 Cal.Rptr. 236 [expert did not identify
subject gang as operating in his area; in fact,

not offer testimony specific to the subject
gangj.)

^YfV»rt w a c f r n m

a n n t h p r inric/ft^Hrkri on/)

A\A

8. The certified copies of the convictions, combined with the recitation of the facts surrounding those crimes, supplied proof of the "who,
when, where and under what circumstances
..." found lacking in In re Leland Z>. (1990) 223
Cal.App.3d 251, 259, 272 Cal.Rptr. 709. The
predicate offenses were established by specific
expert testimony and certified conviction
records, not by "vague, secondhand testimony
...," as occurred in In re Nathaniel C, supra,
228 Cal.App.3d at p. 1003, 279 Cal.Rptr. 236.
The predicate offenses were factually and temporally distinct, and thus occurred, as is required, on separate occasions. (See In re Jose T.
(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1462-1464, 282 CaL
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tremely territorial; venturing onto another ordered stricken, and the consecutive sengang's "turf" is done at great risk. A car tence imposed in count VII is ordered
parked in front of the Costa residence be- stayed per section 654. (§ 1260.) The sulonged to Guillermo Briseno, also known as perior court clerk is directed to modify the
"Rambo," who had recently been involved abstract of judgment accordingly and
in the shooting of a Southside gang mem- transmit it to the Department of Correcber. In the culture of gangs, such an tions and other appropriate agencies. In
incident could not go unavenged and would all other respects, the judgment is afwarrant a retaliatory strike. This consti- firmed.
tuted sufficient evidence that defendant's
CROSBY, Acting PJ., concurs.
actions were done with the intent to aid and
promote Southside.
WALLIN, Associate Justice, concurring.
Defendant cites two cases which found
insufficient evidence to show criminal gang
I1
conduct within the meaning of section 186.I concur in the result only, making the
22. (In re Lincoln J., supra, 223 Cal.
following observations about the lead opinApp.3d 322, 272 Cal.Rptr. 852; In re heion.
land D., supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 251, 272
Much of the officers' "expert" testimony
Cal.Rptr. 709.) He does not claim, nor do
we find, that these cases involved facts was rank regurgitation of hearsay coming
analogous to those here. He also cites the from highly unreliable sources—rival gang
case law involving conspiracy and argues members. The majority opinion glosses
that body of law is apposite. He refers over this fact, but should not However,
primarily to those conspiracy cases which any error was harmless. Sufficient inforfound insufficient evidence of an "agree- mation was from2 personal observations or
reliable sources, and it is not likely the
ment" However, section I979I86.22 does
verdict would have differed without the
not require any sort of agreement between
improper matter. (People v. Watson (1956)
gang members. The elements of conspir46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.)
acy are not the same, and we are unconSimilarly, it was error to allow the testivinced the conspiracy cases cited are of any
mony on such ultimate issues as Gamez's
benefit to defendant.
gang membership and whether Southside is
a criminal street gang. hsoOnce the jury
had the benefit of the officers' expertise on
IV-VIII**
how such gangs operate, their symbols,
and
other topics, the jurors were as able as
CONCLUSION
the officers to decide the ultimate issues.
The stay is removed from the enhance- (See People v. Brown (1981) 116 Cal.
ment imposed for the personal use of a App.3d 820, 829, 172 Cal.Rptr. 221.) But
firearm (§ 12022.5) in count I, and the en- this error was also harmless because it is
hancement imposed for discharging a not probable it affected the verdict
weapon from a vehicle causing great bodily
I disagree with the lead opinion's concluinjury (§ 12022.55) attendant to that count sion that circumstantial evidence was not a
is ordered stricken. The enhancements im- large part of the prosecution case. Alposed for the personal use of a firearm though the identification of Gamez was di(§ 12022.5) in counts III, IV and V are rect evidence, much of the admissible evi**See footnote *, ante.
1. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
976(b), part II of the concurring opinion is not
published.

2. For this reason, I also would find the evidence
sufficient to show Southside was a criminal
street gang.
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dence showing his gang membership, the
criminal street gang status of Southside,
and his intent in doing the acts was circumstantial. The jury should have been instructed on circumstantial evidence. However, it is not reasonably likely the verdict
would have differed had instructions been
given.
!!•••
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Diego County, No. J157882, Runston G.
Maino, J., under statute providing for enhancement where gang activity was involved. Juvenile appealed. The Court of
Appeal, Huffman, J., held that enhancement provision was not unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad and did not violate
equal protection.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <S=>1209
Statute pursuant to which act punishable in different ways under different provisions of Penal Code may not be punished
under more than one such provision only
bars multiple punishment, not multiple conviction. West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 654.
2. Constitutional Law <s=>82(4)
To successfully challenge statute as
overbroad, overbreadth must not only be
real, but must be substantial as well,
judged by legitimate reach of law.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 1, 14.

235 Cal.App.3d 1309

j ^ I n re ALBERTO R, a Person
Coining Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
•.

ALBERTO R, a Minor, Defendant
and Appellant
No. D012369.
Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
Division 1.

3. Constitutional Law <3=»251.4
Fact that word or phrase in statute is
somewhat imprecise does not per se violate
due process requirements. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 14.
4. Criminal Law e=>1206.1(l)
"Promote, further, or assist" as used
in statute providing for sentence enhancement for defendant convicted of felony as
criminal street gang member was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad inasmuch as phrase had been consistently used
by courts to describe aiding and abetting.
West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(b).

After allegations regarding offenses
committed during course of drive-by shooting were found to be true, juvenile was
sentenced in the Superior Court of San

5. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations <5=>101
When narrowly construed to pertain
only to conduct that was purely felonious,
i.e., punishable in state prison, phrase "felonious criminal conduct" as used in statute
making it offense to promote, further, or

mcnt as contrary to the public policy behind
section 11580.2. The Supreme Court pointed
out that purpose of the statute was "to minimize
losses to the people of California who are involved in accidents with uninsured or financially irresponsible motorists
" (Ibid.) The

high court went on to say the statute expresses
the public policy that an insured should "be
protected against damages for bodily injury
caused by an uninsured motorist in the same
territory in which the policy covers him for
liability." (Ibid)

Nov. 7, 1991.
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assist such conduct by gang members was of felony as criminal street gang member
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. did not vest unfettered discretion; Act specifically designated crimes in which gang
West's Ann.CaLPenal Code § 186.22(a).
had to be involved. West's Ann.Cal.Penal
6. Criminal Law $=>1206.1(1)
Code § 186.22(b, e, f).
"Benefit" as used in statute providing
for sentence enhancement for defendant 10. Criminal Law <$=»1206.1(1)
Statutory provision pursuant to which
convicted of felony as criminal street gang
member where felony is for benefit of defendant convicted of felony as criminal
street gang was not unconstitutionally street gang member was subject to senvague or overbroad when term was read in tence enhancement if felony was convicted
conjunction with statute's qualifying lan- with "specific intent to promote, further, or
guage so as to limit scope to only those assist in any criminal conduct by gang
acts committed with specific intent to pro- members" provided adequate notice of
mote, further, or assist in any criminal what conduct was proscribed and was not
vague.
West's
conduct by gang members.
West's unconstitutionally
Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(b).
Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(b).
7. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations $=>101
Phrase "and the last of those offenses
occurred within three years after a prior
offense," which was part of definition of
"pattern of criminal gang activity" contained in Street Terrorism Enforcement
and Prevention Act, was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, despite defendant's anticipated scenarios in which gang
members could be charged for crimes in
future of which they had no knowledge and
in which they did not participate. West's
Ann.CaLPenal Code § 186.22(a, e).
8. Criminal Law «=-1206.1(1)
"Primary activities" as used in statutory definition of "criminal street gang"
whose members could receive sentence enhancement if convicted of felony as member was not unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad despite contention that enforcement would be arbitrary based on who
made decision of what gang's primary activities were; Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, of which phrase
was part, specifically listed felonious conduct required to invoke its provisions.
West's Ann.CaLPenal Code § 186.22(b, f).
9. Criminal Law <3=-1206.3(l)
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations <3=>102
Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act and its provision for sentence enhancement for defendant convicted

11. Criminal Law <$=>1206.1(1)
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations <$=>101
Statute making it offense to actively
participate in criminal street gang activity
and providing for sentence enhancement
based on that activity is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
West's Ann.Cal.Penal
Code § 186.22; U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 1,
14.
12. Constitutional Law e=>250.3(l)
Criminal Law «=>1206.1(1)
Statute providing for sentence enhancement for defendant convicted of felony as criminal street gang member did not
violate equal protection despite defendant's
characterization of enhancement as being
similar to crime of conspiracy, which included procedural safeguards that enhancement did not; conspiracy required agreement with others to commit offense, while
enhancement statute required active participation in felonious criminal gang activity,
and defendant subject to enhancement was
not similarly situated to defendant charged
with conspiracy. West's Ann.Cal.Penal
Code § 186.22(b); U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
14.
li3i2Catherine Aragon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant
and appellant
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George
Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Harley
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D. Mayfield, Asst. Atty. Gen., Keith I. Motley and Esteban Hernandez, Deputy Atty.
Generals, for plaintiff and respondent
_Li3i3HUFFMAN, Associate Justice.
On this appeal we determine the sentence enhancement defined in Penal Code l
section 186.22, subdivision (b), enacted as
part of the Street Terrorism Enforcement
and Prevention Act (the Act), is facially
constitutional and constitutional as applied
in this case.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND2
On February 7, 1990, at about 5 p.m.,
Alberto R., a member of the 38th Street
Shelltown Gang (Shelltown), was a passenger, along with three other Shelltown members, in his ex-girlfriend's car, which she
was driving at his request through rival
gang territory, following another car. As
the cars turned the corner, driving in front
of La Central Store (La Central), a regular
hangout for the Logan Red Steps (Red
Steps) across from Chicano Park, a person
in the first car threw a bottle out the
window and yelled "1920," a known slogan
for the Shelltown gang.
A member of the Red Steps, who was
standing in front of La Central at that
time, bent over while looking toward the
first car. Alberto then fired a few shots at
that person, hitting him in the leg and
lower backside.
Alberto's girlfriend immediately ducked
down in the car and sped off. When she
stopped for a red light, her car was
rammed from behind twice by a large pickup truck which spun her car completely
around. Alberto and his friends jumped
out of her car and ran. After she drove
home, she called the police.
Alberto and six other Shelltown members
were charged with various crimes arising
out of the drive-by shooting. In an amended petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, Alberto was alleged
1. All statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise specified.

to have conspired to commit murder
(§§ 187, 182), to have attempted to commit
murder (§§ 187, 664), and to have committed an assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd.
(aX2)). The attempted murder was alleged
to h a v e b e e n
"willful, deliberate, and premeditated" as defined in sections 664.1 and
189
- lt w a s a l s o alleged the attempted
m u r d e r a n d t h e a r m e d a s s a u l t w e r e con
>mitted b
y Alberto as a gang member under
section 186.22, subdivision (bX2), and that a
firearm was used to commit both crimes
within the meaning of section 12022.5.
Before the jurisdictional hearing, Alberto's case was severed from that of four of
the defendants. Alberto and the other two
defendants were triedj^together. At the
close of the People's case, the juvenile
court granted a motion to dismiss the
charges against the other two defendants
and the conspiracy count against Alberto
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1. After the defense and rebuttal
evidence was heard, the court found the
remaining allegations true. It also determined the attempted murder was without
willfulness, deliberation and premeditation.
At the dispositional hearing, Alberto was
sentenced to the California Youth Authority for a total of seventeen years, consisting
of a nine-year upper term for the second
degree attempted murder, afive-yearconsecutive term for the firearm use, and a
three-year consecutive term for committing
the crimes as a gang member. The sentence and enhancements on the assault
with a firearm were stayed under section
654.
Alberto has timely appealed, launching a
multifaceted constitutional challenge to
section 186.22, subdivision (b) and contending the juvenile court erroneously convicted
him of both the attempted murder and the
assault with a firearm charges which arose
from the same act. We affirm, briefly
resolving his latter contention first, and
then exploring and resolving his constitutional challenges.
2. Because the sufficiency of the evidence is not
challenged, we briefly summarize the pertinent
facts.
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DISCUSSION
I
Section 654 s
[1] Alberto's contention his conviction
for the lesser offense of assault with a
firearm4 must be reversed because section
654 prohibits not only multiple punishment
for offenses arising out of the same act,
but also prohibits multiple convictions is
meritless. Although section 654 has been
interpreted to apply not only to individual
criminal acts, but also to courses of conduct motivated by a single intent or object
(People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625,
636-639, 105 Cal.Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905), it
only bars multiple punishment, not multiple
conviction (People v. McFarland (1962) 58
Cal.2d 748, 762-763, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376
P.2d 449).
To alleviate any possible future dual punishment, our Supreme Court in People v.
Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 361, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d]i?i5595 held "sentences
imposed on [a] defendant can be enhanced
on the basis of convictions for which he
served a sentence; but convictions for
which service of sentence was stayed may
not be so used unless the Legislature explicitly declares that subsequent penal or
administrative action may be based on such
stayed convictions." In the absence of
such legislation, the juvenile court below
properly stayed the assault with a firearm
conviction under section 654. (See id. at
pp. 361-363, 228 Cal.Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d
595.)

vague on its face and its application in his
case is overbroad thereby violating his due
process, freedom of association and equal
protection rights. Alberto's attack first
concentrates on five different phrases within the statute he considers vague and then
switches to other constitutional considerations.
Although a person may not generally
successfully challenge a statute for vagueness if his conduct is clearly covered by the
statute (Bowland v. Municipal Court
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 492, 134 Cal.Rptr. 630,
556 P.2d 1081), a facial challenge on
grounds of vagueness and of overbreadth
is proper when the person challenges a
statute which reaches "a substantial
amount of conduct protected by the First
Amendment
" (See Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 371,103 S.Ct 1855,
1865, 75 L.Ed.2d 903.) Moreover, since Alberto attacks the basic provisions of section
186.22, subdivision (b), which, if found
vague and overbroad, would invalidate the
entire statute, contrary to the Attorney
General's position, Alberto has standing to
make this constitutional attack. (See also
People v. Green (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 692,
696-697, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.)
We therefore address the merits. In
holding section 186.22, subdivision (b) is
constitutional, we first review the applicable law, the language of the statute, its
legislative history, other California cases
that have dealt with or construed the statute, and Alberto's specific constitutional
complaints.

II
Section 186.22, Subdivision (b)

Applicable Law

Alberto's major contention on appeal concerns section 186.22, subdivision (b), which
allows additional punishment when a person is found to have committed a felony as
a "criminal street gang" member. He argues this statute is unconstitutionally

Generally, to withstand a claim of facial
vagueness based on due process considerations, a statute must satisfy two basic requirements:
1 i3i6"First, a statute must be sufficiently
definite to provide adequate notice of the

3. Section 654 provides in relevant part: "An act
cr omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of [the Penal]
code may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case can it be punished
under more than one; ..."

4. Alberto concedes the offense of assault with a
firearm is not a "necessarily [lesser] included
offense" of attempted murder, but argues it is in
effect a "related offense."
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Oklahoma (1973) 413 U.S. 601, 618, 93
S.Ct 2908, 2919, 37 L.Ed.2d 830.)

conduct proscribed. '[A] statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that [people] of
common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of
due process of law. [Citations.]' [Citations.] ' "[B]ecause we assume that [a
person] is free to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws
give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he [or she] may act
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning." ' [Citations.] [fi] Second, a statute
must provide sufficiently definite guidelines for the police in order to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 'A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
judges and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application/ [Citation.] 'Where the
legislature fails to provide such minimal
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit
"a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." ' [Citations.]" (People v. Superior Court
(Caswell) (1988) 46 Cal.3d 381, 389-390,
250 CaLRptr. 515, 758 P.2d 1046.)

These specific rules supplement the fundamental rules for construing statutes
which require us to initially turn to the
words of the statute to ascertain its intent
so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.
(See T.M. Cobb Co, v. Superior Court
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 273, 277, 204 Cal.Rptr. 143,
682 P.2d 338.) As with all provisions of the
California Penal Code, the statute at issue
here must be construed according to the
fair import of its words and, if any ambiguity is found, the legislative purpose will
guide its interpretation. (People v. Community Release Bd, (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d
792, 795-796, 158 Cal.Rptr. 238; Daudert
t>. People (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 580, 586,156
Cal.Rptr. 640.) The words are generally
construed in context with the nature and
obvious purpose of the statute in which
they appear and i i3i7must be harmonized in
light of the enactment's framework as a
whole. (See Webster v. Superior Court
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 338, 344, 250 Cal.Rptr. 268,
758 P.2d 596.) "A statute will not be held
void for vagueness if any reasonable and
practical construction can be given its language or if its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to other definable
sources." (In re Marriage of Walton
(1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 108, 116,104 Cal.Rptr.
472.)

[2] Concerning a challenge to a statute
on grounds it is overbroad, the United
States Supreme Court has "traditionally
viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines." (Kolender v. Lawson, supra, 461 U.S. at p.
359, 103 S.Ct. at p. 1859, fn. 8.) Thus "a
governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state
regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." {NAACP v. Alabama (1964) 377
U.S. 288, 307, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 1313, 12
L.Ed.2d 325.) However, to successfully
challenge a statute as overbroad, the overbreadth must not only be real, but must be
substantial as well, judged by the legitimate reach of the law. (See Broadrick v.

[3] The fact a word or phrase is somewhat imprecise does not per se violate due
process requirements. (Roth t?. United
States (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct
1304,1312,1 L.Ed.2d 1498.) All the Constitution requires is that the words "convey[ ]
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices." (United States v. Petrillo (1947) 332 U.S. 1, 7-8,
67 S.Ct. 1538, 1541-42, 91 L.Ed. 1877.) As
noted by our Supreme Court in People v.
Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1128-1129,
80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225:
"The law is replete with instances in
which a person must, at his peril, govern
his conduct by such nonmathematical
standards as 'reasonable,' 'prudent/ 'necessary and proper/ 'substantial/ and the
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like. Indeed a wide spectrum of human made the commission of criminal offenses
activities is regulated by such terms — by individual members of street gangs sepYet standards of this kind are not imper- arate and distinctly punished offenses, or
missively vague, provided their meaning which would authorize the forfeiture of the
can be objectively ascertained by refer- proceeds of gang-related activity. (Backence to common experiences of man- ground for stated purpose of the Act in
kind."
Sen.Com. on Judiciary report for May 26,
With these legal principles in mind, we 1987 hearing.)
turn to the challenged statute in this case.
B

The final analysis before the Senate
Rules Committee, amended August 29,
1988, reflects the bill was amended several
times in the Assembly to clarify and
strengthen provisions relating to criminal
gang activities and delete the forfeiture of
specified assets obtained through criminal
street gang activities provisions. The final
bill created new crimes related to criminal
street gangs, established criminal penalties
for "(a) willfully promoting or assisting in
any felonious criminal conduct of a street
gang, as defined, and (b) receiving proceeds
derived from a pattern of criminal gang
activity under specified conditions. The
measure further provides for sentence enhancements that would result in an additional prison term for persons committing
crimes in order to promote or assist street
gang members." (Sen.Rules Com., Analysis of Sen.Bill No. 1555 (1987-1988 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Aug. 29, 1988.)

The Statute and Its Legislative History
Section 186.22, subdivision (b) provides:
"(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2),
any person who is convicted of a felony
which is committed for the benefit of, at
the direction of, or in association with
any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in
any criminal conduct by gang members,
shall upon conviction of that felony, in
addition, and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he or she has
been convicted, be punished by an additional term of one, two, or three years at
the court's discretion. The court shall
order the imposition of the middle term
of circumstances in aggravation or mitigation. The court shall state the reasons
for its choice of I mssentence enhanceIn addition, the bill authorized specified
ments on the record at the time of senprosecution agencies and private citizens to
tencing. [11] (2) Any person who violates
this subdivision in the commission of a bring an action to abate as a nuisance any
felony punishable by imprisonment in the building or place used for certain gang
state prison for life, shall not be paroled activities and specifically exempted from
until a minimum of 15 calendar years the Act "employees engaged in concerted
activities for their mutual aid and protechave been served."
tion, or the activities of labor organizations
This section was enacted as part of the Act
or their members or agents." (§ 186.23.)
by emergency legislation in 1988. (Added
Section 186.21 of the Act specifically
by Stats.1988, ch. 1242, § 1, pp. 3135-3183;
Stats.1988, ch. 1256, § 1, pp. 3182-3185.) states the intent of the Legislature in enThe legislative materials concerning the acting the section challenged in this case
Act reflect it was originally crafted to com- (and the entire Act) was to eradicate crimibine criminal penalties and strong economic nal street gang activity which had been
sanctions, including the forfeiture of speci- found to be "individually and collectively"
fied gang member property, in response to a "clear and present danger to public order
the increasingly violent youthful street and safety and are not constitutionally progang members throughout the state and, in tected." (Ibid.) The i ^^Legislature speparticular, in Los Angeles. It was recog- cifically declared the Act was not intended
nized there was no existing law which to interfere with the constitutionally pro-
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tected rights of association5 and freedom
of expression. (Ibid.)
The Act in section 186.22, subdivision (a)
makes it a criminal offense for any person
to actively participate in any criminal street
gang "with knowledge that its members
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity/' and to willfully
promote, further or assist "in any felonious
criminal conduct by members of that
gang."
A "criminal street gang" is specifically
defined under the Act in subdivision (f) of
section 186.22, as:
"any ongoing organization, association,
or group of three or more persons,
whether formal or informal, having as
one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts
enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (8),* inclusive, of subdivision (e), which has a
common name or common identifying
sign or symbol, whose members individually or collectively engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang
activity."
A "pattern of criminal gang activity" is
defined in subdivision (e) of section 186.22,
as:
"the commission, attempted commission,
or solicitation of two or more of the
following offenses, provided at least one
of those offenses occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last
of those offenses occurred within three
years after a prior offense, and the offenses are committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons: (1)
Assault with a deadly weapon or by
means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury
[11] (2) Robbery
[11] (3) Unlawful homicide or manslaughter
[11] (4) The sale, possession for
sale, transportation, manufacture, offer
for sale, or offer to manufacture controlled substances.... [11] (5) Shooting
5. Although the United States and California
Constitutions protect the right of association,
this right may be limited upon a clear showing
an association or organization is actively engaged in lawless conduct. (Dennis v. United
States (1951) 341 U.S. 494, 516-517, 71 S.Ct. 857,
870-871, 95 L.Ed. 1137.)
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at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle.... [11] (6) Arson.... [11] (7)
The intimidation of witnesses and victims
[11] (8) Grand theft of any vehicle, trailer, or vessel
"
ll32oC

California Cases
The constitutionality of section 186.22,
subdivision (a) was upheld earlier this year.
(People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d
692, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) In People v.
Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 140, the defendant, convicted for his
participation in a criminal street gang,
brought claims of vagueness and overbreadth similar to those which Alberto now
raises, that key words in the statute were
undefined, uncertain and were capable of
including persons who became members of
a gang out of intimidation.
The court in Green found the terms "actively participates," "member/' "membership," "criminal street gang," "knowledge," "pattern of criminal gang activity,"
and "willfully promotes, furthers, or assists" to be sufficiently certain to give a
defendant "reasonable notice of the conduct which [the statute] prohibits and is no
more susceptible to arbitrary enforcement
than any other criminal statute." (People
v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pp. 699704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) Although it found
the term "felonious criminal conduct" to
impart some uncertainty, it construed the
provision as covering "only conduct which
is clearly felonious, i.e., conduct which
amounts to the commission of an offense
punishable by imprisonment in state prison." (Id. at p. 704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) As
the court stated, "Section 186.22 does not
prohibit membership; it prohibits the promotion, furtherance or assistance in any
felonious criminal conduct by members.
That a member may not be a whole-hearted
6. In 1989, section 186.22, subdivision (e) was
amended to add the eighth crime to the list of
offenses which constituted a "pattern of criminal gang activity." (Stats.1989, ch. 144, § 1, pp.
966-967.)
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participant in the felonious criminal conduct should have no bearing on the criminal
liability of the person who promotes, furthers or assists such conduct" (Id at p.
700, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.)
The court in Green further noted section
186.22 "carefully circumscribes the conduct
to which it applies; a person cannot be
made criminally liable under it unless he or
she acts with the intention of promoting,
furthering or assisting the commission of a
felony." (People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.
App.3d at p. 704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.)
Three other California cases 7 have specifically addressed section 186.22, subdivision (a) or (b): In re Nathaniel C. (1991)
228 Cal.App.3d 990, 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, In
re Leland D. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 251,
272 Cal.Rptr. 709, and In re Lincoln J.
(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 322, 272 Cal.Rptr.
852. Although each of these cases was
only concerned with the sufficiency of the
ii32ievidence for the gang-related crime or
enhancement and not with either subsection's constitutionality, interestingly, all
three found insufficient evidence to support either the specific elements of the
offense of participation in a criminal street
gang or the sentence enhancement allegation under subsection (b). Each case noted
the statute explicitly defines a criminal
street gang and a pattern of criminal activity (see In re Nathaniel G, supra, 228
Cal.App.3d at pp. 1000-1001, 279 Cal.Rptr.
236; In re Leland D., supra, 22Z Cal.
App.3d at p. 258, 272 Cal.Rptr. 709; In re
Lincoln J., supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at pp.
327-328, 272 Cal.Rptr. 852.)
In re Nathaniel G is perhaps the most
instructive. The court there reviewed a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge as to
the same criminal street gang enhancement
challenged here, stating the term "criminal
street gang" is "the linchpin for the act's
provisions. The phrase is defined specifically, and its application requires proof of
multiple elements." (In re Nathaniel C,
supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 1000, 279 Cal.
7. As we file this opinion, we are aware another
Court of Appeal in People v. Gamez (1991) 235
Cai.App.3d 957, 286 Cal.Rptr. 894 has recently
upheld, as we do here, the facial constitutional!-

Rptr. 236.) The court then listed the elements and, in reviewing each, noted the
element of "pattern of criminal gang activity" for proof of the subsection (b) enhance
ment is slightly ambiguous. It explained,
however, because the statute requires
"only that the offenses be 'committed on
separate occasions, or by two or more persons . . . ' " in order to constitute a "pattern" (id. at p. 1003, 279 Cal.Rptr. 236,
original italics), "[t]he use of the disjunctive in defining 'pattern of criminal gang
activity' means a pattern can be established
by two or more incidents, each with a single perpetrator, or by a single incident with
multiple participants committing one or
more of the specified offenses." (Ibid.)
The court thereafter found the prosecutor
had not presented sufficient evidence to
constitute a "pattern." (Ibid)
The court in Nathaniel G also narrowly
construed the element of proof for the enhancement that it be shown a primary activity of the gang is the commission of one
or more of the eight specified offenses in
section 186.22, subdivision (f). It stated,
"the statute's focus is much narrower than
general criminal conduct; evidence must
establish that a primary activity of the
gang is one or more of the listed offenses."
(In re Nathaniel G, supra, 228 CaLApp.3d
at p. 1004, 279 Cal.Rptr. 236.)
These three cases reflect the narrow construction the California courts are giving
the sections and subsections when called
upon to review the sufficiency of the evidence for convictions under the Act. Such
strict application lends support to our conclusion the statute challenged in this case
is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
D
Alberto's Contentions
[4,5] Alberto, like Green, alleges specific terms in the statute make it so unty of section 186.22, subdivision (b) from vagueness, overbreadth, and due process challenges.
(Id at pp. 969-976, 286 Cal.Rptr. 894.)
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certain and so broad the statute fails to
give fair notice of what conduct it | laaProscribes, thereby inviting arbitrary enforcement by local police, and includes all forms
of association in violation of the First
Amendment. As discussed above, two of
the phrases Alberto challenges, "to promote, further, or assist" and "felonious
criminal conduct," were specifically addressed by the court in Green. (People v.
Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pp. 703704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) We agree with
that court's conclusions, there is nothing
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad
about the phrase "promote, further, or assist," which has been consistently used by
the courts to describe "aiding and abetting" (ibid; see People v. Beeman (1984)
35 Cal.3d 547, 560, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674
P.2d 1318), and that "felonious criminal
conduct" passes constitutional muster
when that phrase is narrowly construed to
only pertain to conduct which is purely
felonious, i.e., punishable in state prison.
(People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 703-704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.)
[6] Alberto also claims the term "benefit o f contained in the enhancement subsection is impermissibly ambiguous because the Legislature may have only meant
for the enhancement to apply when a monetary profit is made by a gang member
committing a crime. Because "benefit"
may be defined as anything contributing to
an improvement in condition, advantage,
help, or profit, Alberto argues the phrase
"benefit of" makes the statute overbroad,
catching within its web those who merely
assist gang members and make no monetary profit. Such a narrow construction of
the term is unwarranted.
The Legislature used the words "profits"
and "proceeds" concerning forfeiture in the
findings and declarations of the Act
(§ 186.21); it knew these words, but chose
not to use them in defining the elements of
the enhancement Thus it is only common
sense the Legislature did not intend such a
restricted view as Alberto offers. Alberto
takes the word "benefit" out of context
and treats it in a vacuum. When it is read
in context with the other words in the
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enhancement subdivision, it becomes clear
the Legislature intended "benefits" to be
interpreted by the qualifying language of
the statute, thereby limiting the scope of
such conduct to only those acts committed
"with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by
gang members...." (§ 186.22, subd. (b).)
As so defined, the potential for vagueness
or overbreadth is eliminated.
[7] Further, Alberto's attempt to create
an ambiguity out of the phrase, "and the
last of those offenses occurred within three
years after a prior offense," contained in
section 186.22, subdivision (e) as part of the
definition of "pattern of criminal gang activity," is meritless. His anticipated scenarios of gang members being charged for
crimes in the future for which they had no
knowledge and in which they did not participate are absurd. The Act must be read as
a whole. Under section 186.22, subdivision
(a), no gang member 11323will be prosecuted
for a future offense unless that person
"actively participates in any criminal street
gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity, and who willfully
promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that
gang...."
[8] Nor is Alberto's attack on the
phrase "primary activities" valid. Alberto
argues the phrase is vague and enforcement would be arbitrary based on who
makes the decision of what a gang's "primary activities" are, criminal or social.
However, the Act specifically lists the felonious conduct required to come under its
spell. In order to enforce this provision,
the evidence adduced at the trial would be
weighed by the trier of fact as in any other
criminal case to determine whether the element of "primary activities" had been proven.
[9] Alberto's due process argument
there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the Act is
likewise invalid. A similar due process argument was raised and rejected in People
v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pages
698-704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140. We agree with
that analysis. Section 186.22, subdivisions
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/e) and (f) specifically designate what ments concerning active participation and
crimes a gang must be involved in before a membership addressed and rejected in Peomember who knowingly and willfully "pro- ple v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at
motes, furthers, or assists in" that conduct pages 699-701, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140. For the
can be found guilty of the enhancement. reasons stated there, and above, we reject
As in all criminal cases, the trier of fact Alberto's argument.
then determines whether there is sufficient
[12] Finally, Alberto claims he is denied
evidence to support the allegations. No
the equal protection of the laws because
unfettered discretion is shown.
[10] Further, Alberto's contention the the enhancement he was charged with falls
"specific intent" phrase of the statute does in the same category as the crime of connot save it from being too vague is spe- spiracy which includes numerous "procecious. The plain language of the statute dural safeguards" section 186.22 does not.
reflects the "specific intent" necessary is Conspiracy, however, is a different breed
"to promote, further, or assist in any crimi- of animal. Its gravamen is the agreement
nal conduct by gang members — " with others to commit an offense. (People
(§ 186.22, subd. (b).) Such is adequate no- v. Horn (1974) 12 Cal.3d 290, 296, 115 Cal.
tice of what conduct is proscribed. As Rptr. 516, 524 P.2d 1300.) Section 186.22's
Alberto concedes, the inclusion of a "specif- gravamen is active participation in feloniic intent" in the terms of a statute will ous criminal gang activity under certain
generally overcome any potential vague- defined circumstances. The enhancement
ness problem; persons of ordinary intelli- of committing gang-related felony crimes
gence will not have to guess at the applica- can be committed without an agreement to
bility of the statute. (See People v. Supe- first commit the crime; it can be committed
rior Court (Caswell), supra, 46 Cal.3d at merely on an aiding and abetting theory.
pp. 390-391, 250 Cal.Rptr. 515, 758 P.2d Because equal protection only ensures persons similarly situated with equal treat1046.)
ment, no denial of equal protection is
Alberto's additional complaints that the shown.
statute is vague because it does not contain
a "scienter" requirement and the prosecution wrongfully analogized the specific intent requirement with the "knowledge" reConclusion
quirement of the crime of conspiracy are
also unfounded. Nothing in the record
We decline to frustrate the Legislature's
shows the juvenile court judge was mislead clear intent in enacting the statute at issue
by the prosecutor's argument regarding here. (Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35
I i324Conspiratorial knowledge, and the stat- Cal.3d 257, 272, 198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d
ute here is plainly directed at conduct, not 732.) Because the Legislature so carefully
on mere knowledge of a criminal activity. affirmed the right of freedom of associa[Ill Moreover, because the plain language of the statute requires "active participation in criminal gang activity," Alberto's assertion that section 186.22 is unconstitutionally overbroad is easily rejected.
The requirements a person know of the
group's criminal activity and intentionally
further the group's illegal conduct limit the
Act's application to those gang members
who actually engage in criminal activity.
Alberto's attempt to twist around the
terms of the statute to create vagueness
and overbreadth is similar to the arcru-

tion and its conviction not to interfere with
those rights, and used limiting language to
define the various criminal actions proscribed, we conclude that under both the
federal and state Constitutions, section
186.22, subdivision (b) provides adequate
notice of the conduct proscribed and does
not unnecessarily sweep too broadly so as
to invade protected areas of association;
the statute is not void for vagueness or
overbreadth. Section 186.22, subdivision
(b) is thus facially constitutional as applied
to Alberto.
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j^sDISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
WIENER, Acting PJ., and
RODRIGUEZ, J.,* concur.

